Youth and internet in Egyptian party politics :
balancing authoritarianism with agency in a condition of negative peace by Henriksen, Tone-Rita
Youth and Internet in Egyptian Party 
Politics- Balancing Authoritarianism with 
Agency in a Condition of Negative Peace
   Tone-Rita Henriksen
Master's Degree Programme in Peace and Conflict Transformation





The process of writing the thesis has been a true roller coaster ride. There have been many 
difficult and challenging times, but it has also been fun, interesting and extremely educational. 
Many people have helped me in different ways throughout the process, warm appreciations 
goes to:
- All of my informants, for sharing their time, thoughts and experiences. This thesis would 
have been nothing without their contributions.
- Party members and others that helped me in the field.
- My supervisor, Ingvild Flaskerud, for giving me the right amount of freedom and guidance. 
Special thanks for helping me find my way the times it all seemed impossible.
- My interpreter, Andrew, for helping me reach informants and get interviews, and for making 
my fieldwork-summer so much more than just that.
- The Peace Class of 2007, for the parties,  the lunch breaks, the coffee breaks, and most 
importantly,  for all the good conversations. Special thanks to Anne and Ingvild for always 
sticking around at the reading room. 
- Mom and dad, for contributing financially to my fieldwork and throughout my poor-student-
years. But most importantly for respecting and supporting all my crazy plans. 
- Carol and Bob, for showing and interest in my studies and for always believing in me.
- My sisters and my friends, for always being there. 
- Fons, for brightening up the spring semester and for decreasing my stress-level.
2
Abstract
The thesis focuses on the role of youth members in political opposition parties in the Arab 
Republic of Egypt. The parties, as well as the state, are authoritarian in structure. The thesis 
discusses possibilities for youth participation in the upper-levels of political parties, and their 
subjective opinions of being included or excluded in internal debates and decision-making 
processes.  In  particular,  the  thesis  discusses  the  parties’ use  of  internet  and  whether  the 
internet  arena  is  a  space  in  which  young  people  can  contribute  in  the  development  and 
working of the parties. The analysis is based on data from first-hand information obtained 
through  interviews  with  members  of  several  Egyptian  parties.  The  discussion  is  situated 
within  academic  debates  on  the  nature  of  agency  within  authoritarian  party  and  state 
structures. 
The conclusion suggests that youth members in Egyptian opposition parties may influence the 
working of the parties. However,  due to the domination of structural  phenomena, such as 
authoritarian structures, patron-client relations and a patriarchal system, youth’s presence does 
not  affect  the  parties  in  a  substantial  manner.  Youth  possess  agency but  do  not  produce 
organizational change, because the structural phenomena are used to control people and social 
entities. It is further concluded that the internet is an arena in which mainly youth members 
participate. The internet gives youth a larger room for involvement, but does not contribute at 
a general party level. This situation is not a result of structural phenomena, but is caused by 
the age gap between leadership and active youth members. The analysis suggests that Egypt 
experiences a situation of negative peace. 
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List of Abbreviations
CPP- Committee of Political Parties’ Affairs
DFP- Democratic Front Party
ISPs- Internet Service Providers
NDP- National Democratic Party
NGOs- Non-Governmental Organizations
NPUP- National Progressive Unionist Party
SLP- Social Labor Party
SMS- Short Message Service (referred to as sms in the paper)
UNDP- United Nations Development Programme
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1 INTRODUCTION
The thesis discusses democratization and political involvement under authoritarian regimes, 
more  precisely,  the  political  opposition  to  the  regime  of  the  Egyptian  President  Hosni 
Mubarak and the National Democratic Party (NDP). I focus on young people's role within the 
opposition. Young people are a large and growing part of the population in the Arab Republic 
of Egypt as well as in the Middle East region (Assad and Barsoum, 2007: 5). Growing up in 
an authoritarian state with high levels of poverty and unemployment, in addition to lack of 
social welfare and good quality education can be a challenge. It is therefore important that 
youth find channels in which they can engage and state their opinions. 
Much has been written about the illegal Islamic opposition in the country,  the largest one 
being the Muslim Brotherhood. I want, however, to focus on a different group of opposition, 
namely the legal political parties. These parties have an interesting position in the political 
arena. On the one hand, they are marginalized from any serious political engagement by the 
authoritarian regime. On the other hand, their existence is encouraged by the authorities as a 
way for the regime to legitimise its control, and further as a way to keep an eye on and control 
the opposition forces (Albrecht, 2005: 391). These parties do not have to hide their activities 
from the state and can participate  in elections,  but in order to  keep their  status there are 
boundaries in which they cannot cross. If they become too confrontational they loose their 
position  (Ibid:  389).  When  this  is  known,  one  might  wonder  how these  parties  function 
internally. How can an oppositional party be in opposition, and at the same time harmonize its 
critique not to upset the power holders? How do parties manage to attract young members 
with such a limited space for action? According to a recent study on youth exclusion in Egypt 
it  is  stated  that  "evidence  suggest  that  civic  participation  yields  positive  developmental 
outcomes: facilitating collective action, yielding more effective and better-targeted services, 
and reducing corruption by allowing channels of accountability" (Assad and Barsoum, 2007: 
6). The authors also state that the opposite, "civic inactivity may contribute to socially deviant 
behaviour such as crime and religious militancy" (Ibid). In fact, Carrie Wickham writes that 
the Egyptian political parties have failed to attract disaffected youth, which in turn has created 
a  vacuum  that  militant  Islamic  groups  have  taken  advantage  of  (2002:  68).  This  data 
illustrates  clearly  the  importance  of  focusing  on  youth  in  general  and  Egyptian  youth 
belonging to political parties in particular. 
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The current political situation in Egypt relates to the situation described as “negative peace.” 
Many  scholars,  among  them  Barash,  distinguish  between  positive  and  negative  peace. 
Negative peace means the absence of war, while positive peace involves “the establishment of 
life-affirming  and  life-enhancing  values  and  structures”  (Barash,  2000:  2).  Even  at  the 
absence of war, violence may exist in a society. Galtung has developed the idea of direct, 
structural  and cultural  violence.  Direct violence is  physical  violence against  someone,  for 
example  killing  children.  Structural  violence  is  indirect  violence  that  is  not  necessarily 
intended, for example children dying out of poverty. Cultural violence is that which justifies 
violence,  in  this  case the killing/starvation of  children,  or  does  not  respect  the value and 
dignity of other people (Ramsbotham et al., 2005: 10-11 and Miall, 2007: 11). To Galtung, 
negative peace is the absence of direct violence in the form of a conflict/war, and positive 
peace the absence of direct violence as well as structural and cultural violence (Ramsbotham 
et al., 2005: 11). 
In my opinion, Egypt is a country in a state of negative peace. The country has been to war 
against the state of Israel on many occasions throughout the last century. Internally, the state 
has also in the last decades raged a fight against militant Islamist groups. Today however, the 
war with Israel is long gone and the state has somewhat managed to clamp down on the 
militant Islamist opposition. In this sense, there is no direct violence in the face of a large 
scale conflict present in Egypt. However, I argue that there is a lack of ”life-affirming and 
life-enhancing values and structures" within the country, and Egypt is therefore in a state of 
negative peace characterized by direct, structural and cultural violence. Firstly, the Egyptian 
state is authoritarian in structure. Democratic participation and co-determination is not taking 
place. Secondly, the authoritarian regime is violating human rights. Torture in prisons is well 
known and lack of fair trials as well. In addition, people are discriminated against because of 
religion and some people are denied proper citizenship. Thirdly, Egypt is a country with high 
economic inequalities where large parts of the population live in severe poverty, with few 
possibilities  of a life in dignity.  These facts  illustrate that positive peace is not present in 
Egypt.  It  also justifies the importance of focusing on the country in  a peace and conflict 
perspective. The political opposition parties, the focus of the thesis, have a dubious position in 
the political  environment.  Leaders  and other  members are  accused of  having links  to  the 
regime,  of  participating  in  dirty  games  of  corruption  and  merely  thinking  of  their  own 
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prosperity. However, by the various parties’ presence on the political scene they are showing 
that opposition and discontent exist and that someone is fighting for change.
1.1 Research Questions
Youth are the future of the Egyptian state.  If  someone is  to bring positive change to the 
country in the future it is them. It is therefore important to understand which political arenas 
youth can enter. Becoming a member of political parties is a relatively safe way to engage, 
and a party offers a place where youth can practice and learn. It is on this account I have 
formed my research questions, which are as follows:
1)  To what  extent  may youth  be  given  the  opportunity  to  involve  in  political  parties  in 
contemporary Egypt? The question is relevant due to the parties’ authoritarian structures. In 
particular, I look at access to formal positions in the different bodies in the party hierarchy and 
subsequently to participation in dialogues and decision-making. 
2) The use of internet is increasing in Egypt, in particular among the younger generation. 
What is the parties’ attitude to internet use, and to what extent has the internet become an 
arena for youth participation in authoritarian party structures? 
The arenas focused on in this thesis are upper-level bodies within the parties and the internet. 
I  find these issues  to  be of  interest  because of  the  authoritarian nature  of  the parties.  In 
authoritarian organizational  structures  youth representation in upper-levels  may be neither 
expected nor accepted. To youth though, this must be an important issue for joining a party 
and for continued membership. In authoritarian parties the internet may be viewed as a threat 
to  the  authority.  Overall,  computers  and  the  internet  are  technologies  young  people  are 
interested  in.  It  is  then  interesting  to  find  out  what  the  parties'  attitudes  are  towards  the 
internet  and  if  they  have  integrated  in  into  their  party  affairs.  As  I  see  it,  both  youth 
representation in upper-party levels and internet integration are issues that are positive for 
youth involvement and participation. If they are present, they are both part of a platform from 
where youth can fight for their political opinions and for a bettering of their own position 
within the parties.
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Another related issue is the actual influence youth have on party politics. This is an issue I 
touch upon, although it is not a main issue. The topic is approached from the perspective of 
individuals’ experiences, but my study on the issue is not comprehensive.  
1.2 Thesis Outline
The following chapter,  chapter two, offers a background to  the field of study.  Through a 
historical review of the political development of the Egyptian state as we know it today, I 
introduce  the  authoritarian  character  of  the  state  and  highlight  challenges  related  to 
democracy  and  multi-party  participation.  The  nature  of  the  opposition  parties  is  also 
elaborated  on,  which  illustrate  their  position  in  Egyptian  politics,  caught  between  the 
intruding authoritarian state and their formal status as opposition parties. It also illustrates the 
many similarities  between the authoritarian regime and the opposition parties themselves. 
This  can  show signs  of  an unfortunate  weak state-  weak society cycle,  which  can  prove 
difficult to alter.
Chapter  three  presents  the  methodology of  the  thesis.  I  have  used  a  qualitative  research 
approach with interviews as my main method of data collection. The chapter mainly concerns 
the fieldwork I conducted in Cairo, where I collected the first-hand data that has been used in 
the thesis. I elaborate on how I got in touch with informants, on the interviews in general, and 
also on other situations and problems faced in the field. In total, this chapter aims to illustrate 
the reliability and validity of the project.
Chapter four presents the theoretical framework. The theories I apply are structuration theory, 
selected understandings of authoritarianism and institutions, in addition to hypothesis on the 
effects of the internet on modern organizations. The main concern here is the balancing point 
between, on the one hand, individual action in the face of youth involvement and, on the 
other, organizational structures, here represented by authoritarianism, institutions and social 
structures in general. 
Chapter  five  presents  data  and findings.  Here,  the  research  questions  and  the  theoretical 
framework  are  combined  to  discuss  first-hand  data  and  secondary  literature.  Youth 
involvement and participation within the parties, in addition to the parties' internet use are the 
focal points of discussion. First, are youth represented in the upper-levels of the parties and 
how far does their involvement and participation go? Second, has the parties'  internet use 
resulted in a larger room for youth to involve within the parties?
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Chapter six presents concluding remarks. Here I sum up important points that have been made 
throughout the thesis and present an overall conclusion of the project. 
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2 BACKGROUND: EGYPT AND THE POLITICAL PARTIES
2.1 Introduction
In this  chapter I present the Egyptian state in a political  and historical perspective.  I also 
elaborate on the current political situation. Further, I present the political opposition parties, 
and give a suggestion to an Egyptian state-society dynamic.
2.2 Egyptian Political History
The establishment of the Egyptian nation-state and political system has emerged from the 
breakdown of the Ottoman and British empires. If we go as far back as to the 16th century we 
find that in 1517 Egypt was put under the power of the great Ottoman Empire, which had its 
base in today’s Turkey (Cleveland, 2004: 41). Egypt became an autonomous province of the 
Empire, and would uphold this status for a long time. In 1882 the British seized control of 
Egypt  (Ibid:  100).  This  was  done  for  several  reasons  and in  the  context  of  the  imperial 
competition of the era. The main reasons were to protect the Suez Canal and to restore the 
country’s political and economic stability (Ibid: 104). Egypt remained a monarchy and Britain 
viewed the country neither a protectorate nor a colony, but ended up influencing state affairs 
and controlling the country until 1956 (Ibid: 100). In the years following its invasion, protests 
against  the  British  occurred  and  anti-imperial  nationalist  movements  developed.  By  the 
beginning of the 20th century three political organizations were established, which all fought 
for independence, but differed in their views on how an independent Egypt should look like 
(Ibid: 109). In 1918 a delegation was established, which would later become the Wafd Party, 
“one of the most widely supported political parties in modern Egyptian history” (Ibid: 194). 
The party demanded a constitution and a parliament. By 1924 a constitution was made and the 
first  Egyptian  parliamentary  election  took  place.  The  Wafd  Party  won  an  overwhelming 
victory, and their party leader became the prime minister (Ibid: 196). With this, an experiment 
of parliamentary democracy came to Egypt. The experiment did, however, not function well 
and as we will see, did not last for long. The difficulties the new system faced were primarily 
due to the power struggle between the king, the British and the Wafd Party. In addition, the 
king was granted enormous powers, and the Wafd leader acted authoritarian and did not want 
to cooperate with the opposition (Ibid: 196-97). These unfortunate traits of power struggle 
have followed Egyptian politics ever since. 
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In the eyes of the people, the new system of parliamentary democracy represented secularism 
and European values. The fact that the government did not manage to improve the situation 
for  the  masses  further  discredited  the  system.  As  a  result,  people  started  to  engage  in 
organizations  outside  the  structured  party  system,  and  organizations  promoting  Islamic 
activism were particularly popular (Cleveland, 2004: 198-99). During and after World War II, 
the political scene was dominated by unstable coalition cabinets, which resulted in a political 
paralysis  (Ibid:  2003).  This,  and  the  Treaty  of  1936,  which  granted  Egypt  relative 
independence from Britain, laid a favourable ground for a group within the military planning 
a coup against the king and the government.
In July 1952 a group calling themselves the Free Officers carried out a coup d’etat. The coup 
resulted in a regime change that has lasted until today. The country was turned into a republic 
and “[t]he constitution of 1923 was abolished,  parliament  was dissolved,  and all  political 
parties  were  banned”  (Cleveland,  2004:  306).  Officers  were  put  in  political  positions, 
resulting in a complete military control of the state (Ibid). After internal struggles within the 
group of the Free Officers Gamal Abd al-Nasser proved victorious and became the president 
of the newly founded Egyptian Republic. He grew to be an authoritarian leader whom did not 
hesitate  to  rid  himself  of  people that  challenged his  authority.  A single-party system was 
created,  which was “designed to guide the popular will,  not to respond to it” (Cleveland, 
2004:  308).  The overall  ideology of  the  Nasser  era  was  socialism,  combined with heavy 
nationalization and the ideology of pan-Arab unity. Nasser died suddenly in 1970, and the 
presidency was, peacefully but not without complications, handed over to Anwar Sadat. He 
changed the course of the Egyptian state, from socialism to a state driven by liberal economic 
principles, and from a single party system to multi-party one (Kassem, 2004: 23). In addition, 
he signed a peace treaty with Israel  that  resulted in Egypt being excluded from the Arab 
League (Cleveland, 2004: 380).
When Sadat created a multi-party system, this did not mean that a democratic system was 
established. The single party created by Nasser was renamed the National Democratic Party 
and Sadat became the party leader. Two additional parties were formed, one leftist and another 
on  the  right  (Cleveland,  2004:  380).  However,  as  indicated  above,  Sadat  remained  the 
authoritarian leader he had always been (Kassem, 2004: 23-6).  In 1981 Sadat was killed by 
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an Islamist group, one of many that grew up during his presidency out of dissatisfaction with 
his policies and the peace treaty with Israel (Cleveland, 2004: 381-2). 
Neither Nasser nor Sadat managed to improve the living conditions for the majority of the 
Egyptian population. This resulted in the alienation of the masses. People viewed the political 
system as closed and headed by people that only cared about personal gains. After Sadat died 
Husni Mubarak became the new president of the country, and he is currently in his 28th year in 
power. He has not improved the situation for the Egyptian people, but somewhat continued 
and further developed the political path stalked out by Sadat. He has continued the liberal 
economic  policies  and further  developed the multi-party system (Cleveland,  2004:  392-3, 
533-4).  However,  similar  to  the  multi-party  system  introduced  by  Sadat,  the  political 
opposition has no real  chance of winning elections and Mubarak rules as an authoritarian 
leader, just like his predecessors.
2.3 The Authoritarian State Power
The current Egyptian system of governance has prevailed for 57 years. This long reign is not 
due to its popularity among the masses, but rather to the authoritarian structures the regimes 
have created.  Such a system includes exclusionary laws,  patronage and cooptation,  and a 
coercive apparatus (Kassem, 2004: 3). 
2.3.1 Exclusionary Laws
The Egyptian constitution is  developed with an unequal  balance of power.  The executive 
office holds tremendous powers in relation to both the judicial and the legislative branches. 
This results in an exclusionary system, and the constitution is therefore viewed as containing 
exclusionary laws. 
In 1971 president Sadat created a constitution that is still in effect today. Here, the immense 
powers of the executive branch are evident. When it comes to the legislature, the president 
can bypass objections the parliament may have and call  a referendum of the people.  The 
president  also  has  the  right  to  dissolve  the  People’s  Assembly,  and  “independent-minded 
legislators  are  denied  both  entry  and  re-entry  to  the  assembly”  (Kassem,  2004:  24). 
Concerning the judiciary, the president is expected to supervise their affairs, and appoint and 
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promote judges and other positions within the judiciary. In addition, he can establish state 
security  courts,  which  gives  him  an  alternative  judiciary  body  when  needed  (Ibid:  25). 
Moreover,  the president  has the power to  promulgate  and object  to  laws,  rule  by decree, 
declare a state of emergency and appoint and dismiss the cabinet (Ibid: 24).
When Mubarak came to power in 1981, after the assassination of the former president, he 
declared a state of emergency. When a state of emergency is declared it is mainly done to 
maintain  political  control.  Because  the  state  of  emergency  has  lasted  ever  since,  it  has 
contributed in upholding the personal authoritarian rule of President Mubarak (Kassem, 2004: 
37). Under such a rule censoring of political activity is allowed. People can be arrested by 
mere suspicion of political crimes and gatherings are severely restricted. In addition, civilians 
can be tried in military courts (Ibid). These restrictions have, among other things, limited the 
political opposition parties to the point where they have difficulties to function and interact 
outside  their  party  offices  (Ibid:  38).  We  can  conclude  by  saying  that  the  constitutional 
framework helps  preserve the political  status  quo and has  provided the  regime “with  the 
flexibility to move from a one-party to a multiparty structure (…) without being challenged in 
the process” (Kassem, 2004: 6).  
2.3.2 A System of Patronage and Cooptation
Kassem  has  observed  that  “in  the  absence  of  democratic  institutions,  accountable 
representation, and a compelling and mobilizing  ideology,  authoritarian  regimes 
depend on the distribution of patronage to establish a clientalistic system that secures some 
form of stability” (2004: 4). A system of patronage involves providing resources to people 
that support your regime, like employees and supporters of your party. These are particularly 
directed at people with power and influence that are part of the cabinet, the army, the police, 
civil service etc. (Ibid). By creating a system of patronage people are co-opted into the current 
political system and their interests are therefore preserved by the endurance of the status quo. 
Such a system can also be called a patron-client relationship. James Scott has suggested a 
definition of the concept:
The patron-client relationship-an exchange relationship between roles-may be defined as a special case of dyadic 
(two-person) ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socioeconomic 
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status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of 
lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal 
services, to the partron (1972: 92).
This illustrates that patron-client relations is a reciprocal system that is vertically organized 
between people of higher and lesser status/power. The patron provides resources while the 
client answers by supporting the patron in one way or another. A patron-client pyramid is a 
vertical relation between various patrons and clients (Scott, 1972: 96). In this sense, a person 
may be a client for a patron above him in the pyramid, while he himself is the patron of 
someone below him again.  In  the  Egyptian case,  President  Mubarak may be seen  as  the 
ultimate patron in the patron-client pyramid. Below him are patrons and clients, but viewed 
from the position of the president, they are all clients in an intricate web that ensures his 
political survival.
 
2.3.3 The Coercive Apparatus
The coercive apparatus largely includes the military and the police.  In democratic states these 
institutions work to defend the country and protect government polices. In authoritarian states 
however, these forces extend deep into the political realm as well. This is done to the point 
that these forces both support and intervene to protect the regime (Kassem, 2004: 7). The 
president is both supreme commander of the armed forces and supreme chief of the police 
(Ibid: 25). In addition, he appoints the top leaders of each of these institutions. The close ties 
between the president and these institutions should therefore be clear. However, the support of 
the coercive apparatus does not come for free. These institutions are therefore heavily linked 
to the patronage system (Ibid: 168).
Some examples of how the coercive apparatus is used to protect the current regime in Egypt is 
provided here. First of all, both the military and the police forces are used to contain and 
control political activists. As mentioned earlier, because of the state of emergency the military 
courts can be used to try civilians, and the police can arrest and detain almost whom ever they 
want (Kassem, 2004: 40). Further, the police supervise elections, both the actual voting and 
the counting of ballots. Thus, the police have a role of “maintaining the regime’s electoral 
success” (Ibid: 41).
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2.4 The Development of Political Parties
As we have  seen  above,  it  was  President  Anwar  Sadat  whom introduced the  multi-party 
system in post-1952 Egypt. The process started publicly in 1976 when it was stated that the 
single  party was to  be divided into three factions:  the left,  the center,  and the right.  The 
following  year  the  president  announced  that  these  groupings  were  to  receive  complete 
political  party  status,  and  a  year  later  Sadat  had  established  his  own party,  the  National 
Democratic  Party  (NDP),  which  President  Husni  Mubarak  seized  control  over  when  he 
followed  Sadat  (Kassem,  2004:  52).  The  NDP naturally  became the  ruling  party,  getting 
favorable  grounds  and  always  winning  elections.  During  Sadat’s  presidency a  few more 
parties  were  created.  However,  a  party  boom  did  not  take  place  before  well  into  the 
presidency of Mubarak (Fahmy, 2002: 71). Today there are 23 legalized opposition parties 
present in Egyptian politics (UNDP), and they are all viewed as weak (Stacher, 2004: 219). 
The interesting point here is that neither of the presidents allowed for a multi-party system 
because  they wanted  true  democracy.  Sadat  created  the  system to  achieve  economic  and 
political goals. Economically it was a way to attract Western aid, and politically it was part of 
an effort to get the old power block of President Nasser’s regime out (Kassem, 2004: 53). 
According to Cleveland “Mubarak’s principal goal was to ensure the survival of the regime”, 
this  was  done  by  “introducing  a  minimum of  structural  adjustments  while  appearing  to 
liberalize political and economic practices” (Cleveland, 2004: 392). In the beginning of his 
reign, Mubarak stated his support for true democracy (Kassem, 2004: 54), and in the two 
parliamentary elections in the 1980s he somewhat seemed to be keeping his word, as the 
opposition parties won more seats in parliament than ever before (not including the Muslim 
Brotherhood and independents) (Fahmy, 2002: 87). However, in the 1990s the table turned 
and  the  regime  tightened  its  reign  (Stacher,  2004:  215).  As  Kassem  suggests,  “the 
characteristics  of  personal  authoritarian  rule  as  exemplified  under  Nasser  and  Sadat  are 
preserved under Mubarak, albeit under the guise of a multiparty system” (2004: 82).
Above we have seen that a multiparty system was created within an undemocratic system. 
The regime that created this system did not want any real opposition to its power. The multi-
party system was merely created as a means to an end, the end being regime survival. But 
how does the regime manage to keep the opposition down? Part of this question has already 
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been answered. It is due to the constitution, which gives unbalanced powers to the president 
over the legislative and the judicial, and the creation of various electoral and political party 
laws. It is also due to the cohesive apparatus, which supports the current regime, and the 
patronage network of benefits and dependence. The opposition parties are in fact part of the 
clientalist network of the regime. In that way, the various party leaders may benefit from the 
status quo, and see no urgent need in pressing for change (Albrecht, 2005: 379, 384). This 
illustrates that the legal opposition in Egypt holds an interesting position that is both linked to 
the regime and to the so-called opposition. How the regime manage to prevent the opposition 
parties from posing a real threat to its power is further due to the state of emergency, which 
limits gatherings, allows for censoring of activities, and also allows for arresting people on 
mere suspicion. In the following I elaborate on electoral and political party laws. 
A committee named the Committee of Political Parties’ Affairs (CPP) has been created. This 
committee has the power to approve or decline groupings applying for legal party status. It 
can also freeze established parties by stopping their newspaper and their activities. The CPP is 
highly linked to the regime and the executive office since many of its employees are part of 
the government. Among these are the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Interior Affairs 
(Fahmy, 2002: 67-8). The Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram Weekly describes the CPP as “the 
government watchdog” (2005). When it comes to allowing a party to form, the CPP has many 
guidelines  to  follow.  The  parties  must  for  example  have  a  party  program  that  is 
distinguishable from all the other parties, and no party can be formed on the basis of class, 
religion, gender, ethnicity or geographical location (Ibid: 67). In addition, people active in 
politics before the 1952 revolution are banned from political activity (Ibid: 68). Such laws, 
coupled with unpredictable decisions from the CPP, have resulted in the fact that ten out of 
eleven parties established under Mubarak have been legalized by court ruling (Kassem, 2004: 
57-8). Meaning that the parties first have been declined by the CPP, and then decided to take 
the  issue  to  court.  In  total,  the  challenges  put  forth  by  the  CPP have  the  objective  of 
“discouraging potential parties from applying for legal status” (Kassem, 2004: 58).
When parties have achieved legal status they also face obstacles in their mere political life. 
The state of emergency contributes much to the hardships political parties face, and several 
laws do the same. Here I focus on the latter. In order to receive representation in the People’s 
Assembly  (the  lower  house  of  parliament)  the  parties  must  receive  eight  percent  of  the 
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national vote, and if this number is not achieved the votes are given to the leading party, 
meaning the NDP (Fahmy, 2002: 69). The Ministry of Interior has been assigned the right to 
decide  where  parties  can  have  gatherings.  This  often  results  in  opposition  parties  being 
assigned distant and inaccessible areas. Moreover, if  an opposition candidate criticizes the 
government during an election campaign the gathering can be dissolved and the candidate 
arrested (Kassem, 2004: 56-7). Fahmy also explains that the party leader and the editor of the 
party newspaper are viewed as responsible for anything that is written in the party newspaper, 
and they can subsequently be sued if it contains any criticism of the executive office (2002: 
68). Another important point that illustrates the difficulties faced by the parties is that between 
1998 and 2004 seven parties were closed down by the CPP (Stacher, 2004: 215).
2.5 The Nature of the Political Parties
The Egyptian opposition parties are, as previously stated, viewed as weak entities. This is due 
to both external and internal factors. The external factors have been presented above, and it 
mainly concerns the regime and the system it  has built  up.  The internal factors however, 
involve the nature of the parties themselves. One important point is the nature of leadership. A 
party leader can sit for an unlimited period of time. This is best observed in the oldest parties 
that were established in the 70s. The same leaders have held office for decades and a change 
in leadership has not taken place until a leader has died. There is also a lack of democracy 
within the parties, to the point where leaders are acting dictatorial. The top leadership often 
seems to take decisions without neither involving other senior members nor the grass roots, 
and if opposition exists it is repressed (Fahmy, 2002: 95-6). Both of these traits, continuity of 
leadership and an undemocratic system, are areas in which the regime receives criticism from 
the opposition parties. It is interesting that the opposition builds their organizations on the 
very same qualities.
Other internal factors that weaken the opposition are divisions within the parties and lack of 
cooperation and trust between parties. The internal divisions have been highly present in two 
of the parties I have been in contact with. The Social Labor Party (SLP) split into a secular 
and a religious faction (Fahmy, 2002: 75). In the New Wafd Party the factions and struggles 
have continued for a long time (Ibid: 79), at one point resulting in the leader expelling two of 
its Members of Parliament (Kassem, 2004: 79). Divisions can in fact go as far as a faction 
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deciding to leave and create a party of its own. Such problems do not help attract members 
and voters in a society where the masses are already alienated from politics. In addition to 
this, lack of cooperation across parties rids the opposition of the opportunity of being a united 
and therefore also a stronger force against the regime. Naturally, the regime finds divisions 
and lack of cooperation within the opposition to be in their benefit, and they tend to play on 
them (Fahmy, 2002: 95-7).
Yet other internal weaknesses are the fact that the parties often lack an ideology and a clear 
political standpoint. Instead, they can be built up around the personality of a prominent and 
charismatic leader or serve the interests of a small group in society (Fahmy, 2002: 97). This 
last point, in addition to the ones listed above, have had serious consequences for the parties’ 
relationship and support among the people. Fahmy writes that “the failure of the parties to 
establish communication channels with the grass roots, […] has contributed to their failure to 
institutionalize the party system in the political culture of the masses” (Ibid).
2.6 The Political Parties in Focus
In this section I shortly present the seven parties that have been engaged in this study. Contact 
with  the  parties  has  taken  place  through interviews  with  party  members.  Methodological 
issues related to the field research are discussed in the following chapter. 
2.6.1 The New Wafd Party
In comparison to the other parties on the Egyptian political scene, the Wafd Party has a long 
history. It was first established in 1919 when Egypt was a monarchy under British control. 
After the coup in 1952, the party was banned. It was allowed to reemerge in 1978, only to find 
itself forced to disband until 1983 (Fahmy, 2002: 77-8). This turbulent history has, among 
other things, resulted in a slight name change from the Wafd Party to the New Wafd Party. In 
this paper it is referred to as the Wafd Party.
The current leader of the party is Mahmoud Abaza (information communicated by informant). 
The Wafd Party is a liberal party and was historically also secular. How it should be defined 
today is a tricky business since the party has cooperated with the Muslim Brotherhood and is 
also demanding the implementation of Islamic  Shari'a law (Fahmy, 2002: 79). The party is 
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promoting  political  reform,  the  development  of  a  new constitution,  a  strict  separation  of 
power and greater civil  liberties.  It  is further promoting a market economy where private 
enterprise is encouraged, but where companies should not be allowed to establish monopoly 
(Al-Ahram Weekly, 1995). 
2.6.2 The National Progressive Unionist Party
The National Progressive Unionist Party (NPUP) was one of the two opposition parties Sadat 
established in 1976, and it was designed to attract leftist groupings. Accordingly, it consists of 
an amalgam of various ideas such as Marxism, socialism and Nasserism, and further of people 
viewing themselves as social democrats and liberal independents. As Fahmy puts it, this leads 
to an “uneasy co-existence, and often calls for compromise solutions” (2002: 73). 
The leader of the party is Mohammed Refaat al-Saed (Egypt State Information Service 1). In 
short, the party calls for liberty, socialism and unity, which they believe only can be realized 
after  a  thorough  democratic  transformation.  The  party  also  promotes  Arab-African 
cooperation and Arab Solidarity (UNDP).
2.6.3 The Social Labor Party
The Social Labor Party (SLP) was created by Sadat in 1978 and was thought to be the new 
loyal  leftist  opposition,  since  NPUP  “failed”  and  turned  into  an  authentic  opposition. 
However, the Labor Party did not stay loyal for long either, and as with the NPUP it faced a 
major crack down initiated by President Sadat (Fahmy, 2002: 74-5). The two parties, SLP and 
NPUP, have similar political views and reaches out to the same social groupings. Hence, they 
challenge and threaten each other’s social base (Ibid: 74).
The long time leader of the SLP, Ibrahim Shukri,  past away last year (Al-Ahram Weekly, 
2008) and I do not know who has taken over the leadership. Over the years the party has 
developed a division between a secular and an Islamic fraction, with the latter taking control 
(Fahmy, 2002: 75). The party promotes both Arab nationalism and Islam. It is further against 
the  “Zionist-American  alliance”  and  supports  “independent  economic  development  that 
avoids the sins of Western development” (UNDP). The party was frozen by the CPP in 2000, 
supposedly due to internal leadership strife. The succeeding investigation found, among other 
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things, that the party had cooperated with the illegal Muslim Brotherhood (Fahmy, 2002: 76-
7). According to a party pamphlet I received from an informant, the Labor Party took the issue 
to court and the CPP’s action was found to be illegal, however, in the summer of 2008 the 
case was still being tried in court.  
2.6.4 The Democratic Arab Nasserite Party
The  Democratic  Arab  Nasserite  Party,  often  just  referred  to  as  the  Nasserite  Party,  was 
founded in 1992, and is well over a decade younger than the ones listed above. The leader of 
the party is Dia al-Din Daowd (Egyptian State Information Service 2). As its name revels, the 
party supports the ideas of President Nasser, which includes socialism and Arab nationalism. 
It  further  supports  constitutional  reform  and  restrictions  on  the  presidency.  The  party 
promotes international cooperation,  but supports  the fight  against  dependency and foreign 
hegemony (UNDP).
2.6.5 The Dignity Party
The Dignity Party is the only party I have been in touch with which is not yet legalized. It 
applied for legal party status to the CPP in 2000, but their application was refused. The party 
then took the matter to court, but lost. Today the party is somehow functioning as the other 
legal  parties.  That  is,  it  has  its  own  newspaper  and  activities,  and  since  independent 
candidates can run for parliament the Dignity Party has two representatives there (informant 
communicated by party member).
The leader of the Dignity Party seems to be Hamdeen Sabahy (Wikipedia). The party is an 
offshoot of the Nasserite Party and believes in socialism. The party seems to have a great 
focus on Arab unity and the Arab personality of the Egyptian state. The Arab character is built 
on the Islamic civilization, but also on Christianity. Within Egypt, the party wants to fight 
poverty and corruption. In their view, Egypt needs deep changes, which can be achieved by 
peaceful resistance and wide civil disobedience. At an international level, it is against what it 
sees as imperialism lead by the United States of America and Israel,  and globalization.  It 
further views the Arab leaders as satellites of the United States (information communicated by 
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party member). As I see it, the party’s harsh political stand must be one of the reasons why the 
party has not been legalized. 
2.6.6 The Tomorrow Party
The Tomorrow Party was founded in 2004 by the now quite famous Ayman Nour. He was 
previously a  member  of  the  Wafd  Party,  but  was  forced  to  leave  the  party after  internal 
disputes (Kassem, 2004: 79). Ayman Nour participated in the first  presidential  election in 
2005, and came second after President Mubarak. Soon afterwards he was sentenced to five 
years in prison charged of forging signatures in relation to his party’s application to the CPP 
(Al-Ahram Weekly, 2006). The current chairman of the party is Ehab al-kholy, while Nour has 
been elected Honorary Leader of the party (information communicated by party member).
The Tomorrow Party is a liberal democratic party,  which believes in a “third way” where 
liberalization and the encouragement of private initiative are balanced with social welfare and 
a  strong  government.  The  party  further  believes  in  freedom  of  thought,  expression  and 
religion, and in the empowerment of all citizens. The party has proposed a new constitution 
where there are more balanced power relations between the executive, the legislative and the 
judicial (information communicated by party member). The Islamic religion receives a special 
place within the party, and it has an Arab focus. The party promotes an Arab Court of Justice, 
further  developing  the  Arab  League,  and  the  development  of  an  Arab  Common  Market 
(UNDP).
2.6.7 The Democratic Front Party
The Democratic Front Party was founded as recent as in 2007. The leader of the party is 
Osama  al-Gazaly  Harb.  It  is  a  liberal  democratic  party  that  supports  a  secular  state 
(information communicated by party members). A truly democratic state is its ultimate goal. 
In  order  to  achieve  this,  the  party  suggests  that  the  country needs  a  new constitution,  a 
canceling  of  the  emergency law,  and an  elimination  of  exceptional  laws  and exceptional 
courts.  Further,  the party promotes the right to establish political  parties and civil  society 
organizations, and it also promotes political decentralization and health care services (UNDP).
23
2.7 Conclusion: the State- Society Dynamic
What we have seen above is a presentation of an authoritarian state that severely represses 
society in order to stay in power. According to Kassem, "restrictions on the public sphere 
from the late 1990s onward have reached an unprecedented level in the Mubarak era" (2004: 
170). We have further seen that the political opposition, here represented by political parties, 
are weak and take on the same characteristics as that of the regime. How are we supposed to 
understand this  reality? Ninette Fahmy proposes a solution. She understands the Egyptian 
state-society  relationship  to  be  that  of  a  weak  state  and  a  weak  society,  which  further 
influences  each  other  to  stay weak (2002:  255-57).  The  weak state-  weak society model 
describes the state as having little capacity to penetrate into society and having an equally low 
capacity to extract resources from it. This results in the state having to use repression, both in 
order  to  carry  out  its  policies  and  to  ensure  regime  survival.  The  repression  the  regime 
executes is a mix between coercion, bribery and corruption. These are signs of a weak state, 
which by its repression further weakens society. Political parties and other organizations are 
therefore also weak and easily take on the same characteristics as that of the state. This result 
in the alienation of the masses, that is already apathetic to the system. The parties cannot 
represent  and promote the people's  interests  and the state  has  built  a  political  system on 
repression. There are therefore no "proper" channels the masses can use in order to state their 
needs and interests, and in that way affect policies. Such a situation force people to develop 
their own strategies of survival,  which are executed through the very same system as that 
created by the state. The result is the fact that "[c]lientele networks, corruption and patronage 
prevail and supplant normal channels of mediation between state and society" (Fahmy, 2002: 
255). It ends up as a vicious cycle where society reinforces the devastating characteristics and 
strategies of the authoritarian state. 
It  is  through this  weak state-weak society model  the nature and position of the Egyptian 
political parties is understood. Further, it is in this context the participation and agency of 
party youth members is interpreted. In the following chapter I elaborate on methodological 
issues concerning the fieldwork I conducted in Egypt. I was fortunate enough to meet with 
members of the opposition parties and hear first-hand how they themselves view their party, 
their position in the political landscape and the role played by youth members.  
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3 METHODOLOGY: IN THE FIELD
3.1 Introduction
In the following I introduce the methodology of my research on youth members in political 
parties in Cairo, Egypt. I start by briefly introducing the concepts of validity and reliability, 
and then move on to my chosen methodology. Here I elaborate on the qualitative research 
approach, and on my data collecting method of interviewing. Moreover, I intend to present the 
most important aspects of the data collecting process; the choices I have made in relation to 
informants, the use of translators, and the issues of registration and ethics. My goal is to be 
honest and transparent about the process, I therefore reflect on the choices I made in the field 
and try to judge them objectively and see what could have been done differently. 
 
This thesis is based on a qualitative research method. Two concepts are important for the 
qualitative research method, namely that of reliability and validity. These two concepts can 
help  determine  "the  quality  or  sustainability  of  qualitative  evidence"  (Ritchie  and Lewis, 
2003: 270), and they concern the whole research process, from fieldwork sampling to the 
making of analysis and conclusions (Ibid: 270-275). The two concepts are therefore important 
to take into consideration, not just in relation to methodological concerns, which here mainly 
focuses on fieldwork, but in all parts of the research. The word reliability means 'sustainable', 
and  concerns  the  replicability  of  findings,  meaning  that  if  a  person  did  the  exact  same 
research as another person, they would end up with the same findings.  Reliability further 
concerns the ability to generalize beyond the research sample (Ibid: 270, 272). Validity means 
'correctness' or 'precision' (Ibid: 273). Hammersley has explained that "an account is valid or 
true if it represents accurately those features of the phenomena that it is intended to describe, 
explain,  theorise"  (Ibid:  274).  Validity  therefore  also  relates  to  the  accurate  use  of 
measurements, which means that findings must be labeled with the correct words, and that the 
correct  research “path” is  chosen so that one is  measuring the intended (Ibid: 273).  Even 
though  these  two  concepts  concern  different  aspects  of  research  they  end  up  demanding 
similar methods of reassurance. First,  they demand extensive checks on the quality of the 
data/findings. Second, they both demand a detailed presentation of the research process (Ibid: 
272, 274). It is mainly the importance of a presentation of the research process that is the focus 
of this chapter. However, the two demands are highly interrelated, because if the fieldwork, 
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and the research process in general, are not of appropriate quality, the findings will be less 
trustworthy as well.
3.2 Qualitative Study
Qualitative research can be described as “a naturalistic,  interpretative approach concerned 
with  understanding  the  meanings  which  people  attach  to  phenomena  (actions,  decisions, 
beliefs, values etc.) within the social worlds” (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003: 3). Further, Holliday 
illustrates that the researcher can only “(…) explore, catch glimpses, illuminate and then try to 
interpret bits of reality” (2007: 6). We can then say that the researcher can interpret bits of 
reality and through that an understanding can be achieved. 
Methodology “refers to the choices we make about cases to study, methods of data gathering, 
forms of data analysis etc., in planning and executing a research study” (Silverman, 2005: 99). 
The reason why I chose a qualitative and not a quantitative approach is because I found it 
suitable for my research. As Silverman has stated, the topic should decide what methodology 
a researcher ends up using (Ibid: 6). When carrying out my research I wanted to learn about 
youth's experience in political parties in Egypt. In order to be able to dig deep into this reality 
I had to sacrifice scope for detail.  Here I have presented a division between two research 
methodologies, that of the qualitative and the quantitative. It is however important to be aware 
of  the fact  that  these two are  not individually unified "paradigms",  but rather  consists  of 
various traditions. 
My main  research  approach  has  been  interviews  with  selected  informants.  An  important 
motivation for using this method has been the lack of data on the topic, and qualitative field 
research could bring new knowledge into the field. Participant observation is another widely 
used method in qualitative research. I was, however, not able to use this method sufficiently. I 
shall return to this below. 
3.3 Interviews
I traveled to Cairo on May 31st 2008 and ended my fieldwork on August 1st. During these two 
months I conducted interviews with leaders and youth members of political parties. In total, 
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people belonging to seven different parties were interviewed. The initial plan was to interview 
one leader and one youth member from each of the parties I got in touch with. I ended up 
interviewing one leader from each of the seven parties, and in total 14 youth members. Of the 
14 some were not properly interviewed, they came along as friends of the informants, and just 
made comments  when they found it  suitable.  In  reality  I  therefore  interviewed  11  youth 
members in the proper sense of the word. In addition to party members, I interviewed a non-
partisan political activist and one of the leaders of a liberal youth organization.
In-depth  interviewing  is  one  way  of  organizing  an  interview.  It  can  be  described  as  an 
unstructured interview, or as a form of conversation (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003: 138). This 
method is a good facilitator for making unforeseen discoveries about the research topic, which 
is  something Holliday describes  as an important quality of qualitative research (2007: 5). 
When planning for fieldwork I prepared for a mix of in-depth and structured interviews. This 
was done in order to get answers to specific questions that I found important, and also invite 
the informants to guide me to issues which they viewed as important. Question guides were 
prepared, one for party leaders and one for youth members, with topics that I wanted to touch 
upon during the interviews. In this way the interviews were supposed to be semi-structured, 
in-depth sessions. Some interviews, especially with party leaders, ended up more structured 
then  I  planned and hoped for.  I  met  them in their  offices  between appointments  and we 
therefore had limited time available. To save time, we worked our way through the question 
sheet.  The interviews with the youth members were, on the other hand, more in-depth in 
character. We often met in a relaxed place, like in a café, and the informants usually had more 
time available. These factors resulted in a relaxed atmosphere where the conversations had a 
natural flow. However, I find it important to specify that not all interviews with leaders were 
structured and not all interviews with youth members were particularly in-depth. There was a 
mix, but it was more or less as described above.
Interviews are affected by the people that participate, in addition to the place and time in 
which it is conducted. This is something Hanne Bjertnæs elegantly points out in her thesis; 
"[a]ll conversations are ultimately interactions set on a social stage, where we act according to 
circumstances or participants. The setting is the stage, and what performance we put on is to a 
certain degree dependent on the audience" (2007: 26). This quote leads me to an additional 
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explanation for the difference in nature between the interviews with youth members and party 
leaders. Dealing with leaders in a political environment where positions and authority matters 
can affect the researcher and thereby the interview. Managing to get interviews with busy 
party leaders that  have great respect among their  colleagues most likely affected me as a 
researcher. I consequently acted in a more formal fashion, which resulted in more structured 
interviews. This illustrates that there can be several reasons why interviews take a specific 
direction.
Participant observation can be explained as doing research while being part of a social setting 
(Glesne, 2006: 49) Valuable information can be extracted, and the method can be particularly 
fruitful  when  combined  with  interviews.  Glesne  has  suggested,  "through  participant 
observation (...) you learn first-hand how the actions of research participants correspond to 
their words" (Ibid).  In relation to my research it would have been interesting to observe the 
daily routines in a party office and to observe settings where youth members and party leaders 
worked together. Such observations would have given my interviews a deeper foundation in 
the  reality  of  the  field,  and  it  would  also  have  given  me,  as  a  researcher,  a  deeper 
understanding of my topic. There are various reasons why these kinds of observations did not 
take place. One is the lack of sufficient planning before entering the field. Another is that I 
had to put much effort into getting the amount of interviews needed. And yet another factor is 
that  the  political  parties  in  Cairo  are  not  organized  into  units  of  people  working  closely 
together at all times. People come and go, and when they are at the office they seem to work 
in separate rooms. Conversations, both informal and formal, seem to take place in the halls, of 
course depending on the size of the party office. This is my impression from visiting parties 
when conducting interviews. The number of visits was limited, but these observations gave 
me the  understanding  that  simply spending a  day in  a  party-office  would not  have  been 
particularly fruitful. On the other hand, participating in various activities, such as seminars, 
meetings,  and  rallies  could  have  been  useful.  My lack  of  competence  in  Arabic  would, 
however, have been an obstacle. Moreover, it  is an open question whether party members 
would have allowed me to do such observations. To conclude, more effort should have been 
put into participant observation. How it would have been perceived by party members, and if 
it would have been a fruitful experience is impossible to judge. 
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3.4 Informants
My interview subjects were leaders and youth members of seven different political parties. In 
particular,  I  wanted  to  speak with youth  members,  since they are  the main  focus  of  this 
research. Leaders were chosen because they have significant power within the parties, and are 
somehow responsible for the status quo of the organizations, as well as for their near future. 
Approaching both groups would allow me to learn about youth's role in the parties and their 
general  participation in the parties  from two perspectives,  the youth and the leaders.  The 
leaders could also contribute with valuable information since a leader is supposed to have 
extensive knowledge about his/her party. 
In  general,  “Youth”  and “young people”  are  two vague terms.  In  the  thesis,  I  apply the 
understanding the parties themselves have of what a youth member is. Usually a person can 
be a member of the parties’ youth committee/union until he or she has turned 35. In a few 
parties, the age limit is 30. A person who has past 30 is generally speaking not a youth, but 
since the leaders of most parties are elderly men in their sixties and seventies, 30 years of age 
is  relatively young. Throughout the thesis  I refer to youth members as one unified group 
within each of the parties. The Egyptian parties are, however known to be split into different 
rival  factions,  and  the  youth  members  must  also  be  understood  as  participants  in  these 
rivalries. I treat them as one group, “the youth”, because it is convenient in relation to my 
topic.  
The informants were mainly male. Only two informants were female, one was a leader and 
the  other  was  a  youth  member.  This  is  not  to  say that  women are  not  involved in  party 
politics, but there were few women present in the party offices when I contacted them, and I 
was  seldom  referred  to  a  female  member  for  further  interviewing.  This  is  in  itself  an 
interesting issue, but since the research does not focus on gender differences I do not explore 
the phenomena further. 
  
In order to get in touch with party members I used four different strategies. First strategy was 
to go directly to the party office. This was the preferred strategy and was used whenever 
possible. The second strategy was to call the party office, through the help of an Egyptian 
friend.  My Arabic speaking friend helped when neither my English nor Arabic skills were 
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sufficient. The third strategy was to contact party members on Facebook. This was a strategy 
not  frequently  used  since  I  had  a  difficult  time  locating  political  party  members  on  this 
website. However, Facebook is popular among politically active Egyptians, especially young 
people, and is therefore a useful website to follow in order to get some insight into what is 
happening on both the formal and the more informal political arenas in Egypt. This is an issue 
I  elaborate  on  in  chapter  five.  The  fourth  strategy  was  to  let  party  members  already 
interviewed guide me to other members or people active in other political parties.
3.5 Reflections
When I contacted parties, either in person or by phone, I asked to interview one of the leaders 
of the party. This resulted in interviews with leaders holding different positions, some more 
powerful than others. This is a choice that can be criticized. Different positions of leadership 
have different responsibilities  and most likely deal with youth to a various degree and in 
different ways. For comparative reasons, it could therefore have been reasonable to interview 
people in the same leadership position in the various parties. However, I decided not to do it 
this way, partly because it would have been too time consuming. Often, the interviewee was 
the leader present at the time I contacted the party, or the one that could speak English. The 
other  reason why it  was  decided  to  interview leaders  in  various  positions  was because  I 
assumed that the topics of youth members and parties’ relationship to the internet were topics 
most  leaders  had  knowledge about.  This  seemed to  be the case and it  was  therefore  not 
viewed as problematic to interview people holding different positions of leadership.
The fourth strategy used in order to get in touch with informants was to let party members 
already interviewed introduce me to other party members. This was a strategy mainly used to 
get in touch with youth members of the various parties. I usually first interviewed a party 
leader and by the end of the interview I asked if he could put me in contact with one of the 
youth members. This raises a question of reliability. One can ask if it was correct to let party 
leaders introduce me to youth members? This is an important question to ask considering that 
the interviews evolved much around youth’s influence and position in the various parties. 
Since the leaders interviewed knew this, they could intentionally have introduced me to youth 
members they knew were satisfied with their role in the party. In that sense, the leaders could 
intentionally  have  shaped  the  data  into  taking  a  specific  direction.  However,  this  is  not 
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believed to be the case. The leaders usually put me in contact with youth that knew English, 
the leader of the youth committee/union, or youth that were already at the party office. This 
can illustrate that  the leaders most  likely did not introduce me to  youth they had chosen 
because of their “correct” view of the party and the leadership. 
Another case also raises the issue of reliability. One leader I interviewed decided to introduce 
me to two youth members already in the office. These did not speak English so the leader, 
who was  fluent  in  English,  translated  for  them.  To let  a  party  leader  translate  for  youth 
members in an interview partly evolving around their opinion on youth’s level of influence 
and position is problematic. The ‘dependability’ (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003: 271) of some of 
the data collected in this interview can therefore be questioned. These parts of the interview 
will  be treated with some scepticism. However,  the interview has also presented valuable 
information that I do not find a reason to question. In addition to this, it was interesting to see 
the  leader  and  the  youth  members  interact.  In  my  view,  there  was  a  relaxed  and  easy 
atmosphere.  The youth,  without knowing what  the leader previously had answered to the 
questions he was presented with, gave many similar answers.  
Five of the seven parties I was in contact with have official political party status, in addition, 
the Dignity Party has not received legal status as a political party and the Social Labor Party is 
currently frozen.  In both cases I did not know about their political status until  during the 
interview. After the interviews I evaluated their relevance to my project, and concluded that 
they were both still highly relevant. Both parties have the same internal structure as the legal 
parties and behave in similar fashion. The only significant element that distinguishes them 
from the other parties is how they are treated by the regime. This discussion can be taken 
further and put in relation to the limited role the political parties play in Egyptian politics. One 
can therefore ask what difference it makes if a party is illegal and cannot formally participate 
in elections when the legal parties that do participate cannot win any significant number of 
seats? When it is also known that people belonging to illegal parties and movements run as 
independents in election and can win seats in parliament, the difference between legal and 
illegal/frozen parties become even more insignificant. 
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3.6 Translator
Because of language barriers  a translator had to be engaged. An Egyptian friend of mine 
offered to help. This was something he did in addition to help make phone calls, as mentioned 
earlier. In total he was an interpreter in relation to three parties. There are both advantages and 
disadvantages in using an interpreter. The main advantage was that by engaging a translator it 
was possible to interview party members that did not speak English. In one party at least, the 
translator was an essential part  of me being able to conduct any interviews, since no one 
seemed  to  speak  English.  The  main  disadvantage  with  using  a  translator  is  that  the 
information received becomes second-hand. The information presented by the informant is 
not directly received by the researcher, but first goes through an interpreter whom quickly has 
to translate the information received. In such a process data can be lost. In addition, other 
problems depending on the situation can occur.  In my case,  I  lost  some control  over  the 
interview session. Time was spent during the interviews explaining questions to the translator, 
and sometimes he also slightly changed the questions presented to him. Further, I  did not 
always get a full translation during the interviews, which made me less able to pose questions 
to the informants’ answers. However, most of the time the interaction between the translator 
and myself went well, and we improved after each interview. 
The advantages and disadvantages listed above are directly related to the researcher. However, 
using a translator can also result in implications in relation to the informant. How does the 
informant feel about having a translator present? If the informant is not comfortable with it, 
he  can  decide  not  to  share  specific  information.  In  a  country  like  Egypt,  which  is  an 
authoritarian state, the issue of using an interpreter is important to discuss. It is even more 
important  when the interpreter  is  an Egyptian citizen.  In  an authoritarian state  where the 
political parties live on the mercy of the regime, it is important to know whom you share 
information with. If something is said to the wrong person, the security of informants can be 
jeopardized. My topic of research did not directly involve the Egyptian state. I study relations 
inside the political opposition. But since the political parties are part of the political milieu of 
the state,  they are naturally affected by it.  Therefore,  during the interviews, the state was 
usually mentioned in one way or another. However, engaging a local translator could also 
have made the informants feel more comfortable. They were allowed to speak in their own 
language and had a person present that could better relate to the information they presented. 
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The fact that the level of freedom of expression is higher in Egypt that in other authoritarian 
states in the region makes it less problematic for a person to express his views on various 
issues.  From my point  of  view,  engaging  a  translator  did  not  affect  the  informants  in  a 
negative way. I would even dare to say that it affected them in a positive manner. However, 
this is difficult to judge objectively.  
Four  interviews  were  conducted  using  party  members  as  translators.  One  was  the  case 
described above where the party leader translated for the two youth members. In two other 
cases a leader was present and available for an interview when I showed up at the party office. 
The leader could not speak English so an English speaking party member was located and 
translated  during  the  interview. In  one  of  these  parties  the  same  translator  was  used  the 
following day when I returned to interview a youth member. 
Mainly the same advantages and disadvantages of using a translator listed above apply when 
using party members as translators. In addition, these translators seemed to get quite involved 
in the interview session. While translating they would sometimes present their own opinion 
on  different  issues.  Also,  when  a  translator  belongs  to  the  party  the  issue  of  sharing 
information changes. Here, the informant knows the interpreter, at least on a political level, 
and the uncertainty about revealing information that may cause harm should not be present. 
However,  since  the  interviews  mainly  evolved  around  internal  party  issues,  using  an 
interpreter  from within  the  party  could  have  resulted  in  informants  not  telling  their  true 
opinion about certain topics. 
3.7 Registration
Most  interviews  were  recorded  on  a  digital  recorder  and  transcribed  afterwards.  A few 
interviews were recorded manually. I wrote down as much as I could during the interviews 
and shortly afterwards filled it out more extensively. Using a tape recorder is, in my view, a 
more accurate and objective way of recording. But deciding which method to use, usually 
comes down to what the researcher feels comfortable with. When using a tape recorder I 
personally  found  it  easier  to  make  the  interview  more  of  a  conversation  than  a  formal 
interview.   However,  when  recording  manually  I  found  it  easier  to  pay  attention  to  the 
relevance of the data received during the interview, simply because I then wrote down what I 
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found to be important, and before leaving the informant I could easily check if all the needed 
data was collected. 
  
Two of the interviews were transcribed by the interpreter. He offered to do this because he felt 
that he did not manage to translate sufficiently to English during the interviews. I do not know 
how accurate his translations from Arabic to English are. However, the translator did not have 
any  political  affiliations  and  would  in  that  sense  not  have  a  reason  for  changing  the 
informants' statements.
 
3.8 Doing Research in the Middle East
Being a European person and a woman doing research in an Arab/Islamic society did not 
result in any difficulties per see. Cairo is a big city with a great variety of residents. The city is 
also visited by many tourists and has quite a few foreign residents. My presence was therefore 
not  remarkable.  However,  I  do believe that  my effort  to  dress  modestly gained me some 
respect and trust among my informants, and other people I had to deal with throughout the 
fieldwork. It is common among Egyptian woman to dress modestly, and the majority also 
wears hijab (a shawl to cover their hair and neck). I did not wear a hijab, mainly because I did 
not find it necessary nor personally appropriate. When dressing modestly I felt that I managed 
to distinguish myself from European tourists and others enjoying the city without being aware 
of the local customs. I found this important to signal since I needed the informants' trust, and 
in  order to achieve this  they needed to  know that I  was interested in and respected their 
culture.
Being a European doing research in Egypt can be an advantage in some respects. Being a 
political person in an authoritarian state representing some kind of opposition to the ruling 
elite can be a challenge. It can be dangerous to talk to strangers and you have to be careful 
about  what  you say.  This  often  result  in  suspicion towards  others,  and  being open about 
political matters to people you have just met can be a challenge. In those cases it can be easier 
to trust a foreigner. The likelihood of him or her being involved on the "wrong" side of state 
politics is low. This can be one of the reasons why I did not face any particular problems 
when it  came  to  finding  informants  and conducting  interviews.  Moreover,  I  also  got  the 
impression that many of the youth members appreciated the fact that a foreigner had come to 
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Egypt to study their role in the parties. The majority of the youth were eager to share their 
experiences and opinions on my research topic.
As  previously stated,  my identity  as  a  European  woman did  not  prevent  me  from being 
accepted  or  taken  seriously.  The  language  barrier  was  felt  as  a  stronger  obstacle.  My 
proficiency in Arabic is low and many Egyptians cannot speak English. Not knowing Arabic 
properly made it challenging to direct myself in the field, to get in touch with party members, 
and to conduct interviews. However, the language differences did not seriously challenge the 
research. It only created slightly more work and the fact that a translator sometimes had to be 
engaged. This resulted in a few problems, but I was nevertheless able to get interviews with 
party members that  did not speak English. This was, in my view, more valuable than the 
problems faced when using a translator.
3.9 Ethics
My informants did usually not find my presence and requests  for interviews problematic. 
Because of that it often felt out of place to show the informants written documents of my 
identity as a student, ask them for consent to use the information they presented, and explain 
that I would not revile their identity. Because of their relaxed attitude towards my work I 
sometimes also forgot to do this. But all informants new that I was a student whom would use 
the information they presented in a thesis. This is however not the correct fashion of doing 
research ethically right, and I see now that I should have been more clear about my own role 
and the informants' role while on fieldwork. Some of the informants do probably not mind 
having their name published in this research, but because I did not always settle this matter 
during  the  interviews  and  because  I  had  already  decided  to  keep  all  my  informants 
anonymous I will do just that.   
Before the interviews formally started I asked if I could use a recorder and explained that it 
would only be used for personal reasons and would not be shown to anyone else. None of the 
informants had problems with it. At one point an informant told me that I should not share the 
information he presented with anyone,  only use it  in relation to  the thesis.  Names of the 
informants and the interviews, both the digitally recorded version and the written version, are 
stored separately. In some cases the first name of informants are present on the digital version, 
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either because informants or I have unconsciously said them during the interviews. These 
names are however not present in the written version. 
3.10 Conclusion
In this chapter I have elaborated on the methodology and methods used in this research. I have 
also  discussed  important  issues  and  problems  that  I  faced  during  fieldwork.  This  has 
hopefully made for a clear understanding of where the data I  use in the analysis  chapter 
(chapter five) comes from, how I have obtained it, and subsequently how valid and reliable it 
is. In the following chapter I present the theoretical framework, which is also an important 




In the following I elaborate on the theoretical framework that is used in the thesis. I define 
concepts that are important, such as authoritarianism and institutions. I also present the theory 
that I have chosen to use, namely Anthony Giddens' structuration theory. In addition, I use 
James Slevin's hypothesis on how modern organization can be affected by their use of the 
internet. I do not intend to give a complete review of the concepts or the theories, but focus on 
the points that are relevant for my work.  
4.2 Authoritarianism
The Egyptian state and the political opposition parties in the country can be described as 
authoritarian (Stacher,  2004: 219). My main focus is on the authoritarian character of the 
parties, but since the state is also authoritarian and quite intrusive on the political and civil 
society, it is important to include the state in the discussion. 
In the book Non-Democratic Regimes, authoritarianism is described as “a situation where (a) 
freedom is  restricted  in  favour  of  obedience  to  authority,  and  (b)  this  authority  is  itself 
exercised  with  few  restrictions”  (Brooker,  2000:  22).  In  my  study  of  the  organizational 
structure of political parties, the “authority” is the party leaders, who are often senior men. 
However,  at  a  state  level,  the  authoritarian  Egyptian  state  that  is,  the  parties  are  heavily 
controlled  and  their  freedom  to  act  is  limited.  Thus,  the  party  leadership  acts  in  an 
authoritarian fashion within its party organization, while it at the same time is subject to an 
authoritarian state. 
The authoritarian structures of power and influence illustrates that organizations, at least in 
authoritarian states, cannot be properly understood if only studied in isolation from the rest of 
the society. The authoritarian Egyptian state is intrusive on society and any organizational 
study would fall short if the state power is not included in some way. According to Juan J. 
Linz, authoritarian regimes usually have a privileged party. Other political/societal groups can 
be  allowed,  but  their  presence  is  decided  upon  by  the  regime.  Such  an  arrangement  is 
described as  limited  pluralism.  However,  much of  the pluralistic  forces  end up somehow 
connected to the ruling elite. Leaders of various sectors and institutions are co-opted into the 
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system and subsequently become participants of it (Linz, 2000: 161). Linz further explains 
that authoritarian regimes often have a semi-opposition that is legal, in addition to the illegal 
opposition.  The  semi  opposition  has  an interesting  position  in  society,  in  that  it  partially 
criticises the regime and at the same time is involved and participates with it. Such a situation 
results  in  costs  imposed  by  the  regime  on  the  semi  opposition.  This  can  explain  their 
frustration, disintegration and the fact that they allow themselves to be co-opted by the regime 
(Linz, 2000: 168-70).  
The Egyptian regime is made up of members of the National Democratic Party, which here is 
the privileged party.  As described in chapter two, the Egyptian state has opened up for a 
multi-party system and it has also allowed non-governmental organizations and other societal 
groupings to form. However, it is difficult for such groupings to become legalized and if they 
do manage to obtain legal status these groupings, either it being political parties, NGOs or 
professional syndicates, are heavily controlled by the state. Hence, there is as Linz explained, 
limited  pluralism  present  in  Egypt.  The  Egyptian  opposition  parties  fit  well  with  Linz's 
description of a semi-opposition. The parties are restricted by the regime and many of their 
members are co-opted into the state's patron-client relations.
Linz further explains that authoritarian regimes usually lack a specific ideology. This can be 
due to intricate power relations, which makes the domination of an ideology impossible or at 
least challenging. This lack of ideology results in both positive and negative realities for the 
regimes. When it comes to the positive aspects, the lack of an ideology dampens the cleavages 
present in the regime coalition, and allows the regime to uphold the loyalty of the various 
fractions. It further makes the regime able to adapt relatively easy to changing conditions, 
especially in relation to the more hostile groupings in society. Opponents can be neutralized, 
actors can be co-opted, and the regime does not have to worry about living up to ideological 
utopian standards (Linz, 2000: 162-4). The negative results of not having a specific ideology 
are  mainly  that  it  alienates  groupings  in  society  from  political  participation,  and  mass 
mobilization seems impossible. Intellectuals, students, youth, and deeply religious persons are 
the groups that are the most difficult to involve (Ibid: 164). 
The Egyptian regime does not have a specific ideology. Regime survival seems to be the main 
priority.  In  general,  the  political  parties  have  also  been  described  as  not  having  a  clear 
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political  standpoint/ideology,  but  rather  built  up  around  the  personality  of  a  charismatic 
leader.  However,  as described in  chapter  two, many of  the parties have some ideological 
foundation, either it being socialism, liberalism or pan-Arab unity. The issue of ideology may 
then be a breaking point between the Egyptian state, consisting of the co-optation of various 
sorts  of  social  groupings,  and  the  relatively  small  political  parties.  However,  concerning 
authoritarian structures, the state and the parties are similar.
    
Moreover, Ninette Fahmy has described the Egyptian state as having several similarities with 
the bureaucratic authoritarian state model developed by O‘Donnell (Fahmy, 2002: 242-45). In 
short, O'Donnell's model includes authoritarian regimes that incorporate various bureaucratic 
segments into the state machine. There is usually a strong connection to the military and to 
other public bureaucracies. Private bureaucracies like business corporations, technocrats and 
social sectors are also included. This inclusion by the state of bureaucratic segments is done in 
order  to  control  social  sectors  by  “encapsulating  their  political  representation  into 
government-dependent interest groups and/ or political parties” (Brooker, 2000: 30). This is 
done in an attempt to politically exclude and deactivate the popular sector (Ibid).
Fahmy points out that the Egyptian regime is built up by “an alliance between the state, the 
military and selected segments of the bourgeoisie” (2002: 242). There is a particularly strong 
connection to the military. An evidence of this is that since the revolution in 1952, all three 
presidents have come from the military (Ibid). Another similarity between O’Donnell’s model 
and the Egyptian state is that the relations of power are organized in favour of the executive 
office. In Egypt the president holds enormous powers. In addition, the Egyptian state behaves 
exclusionary by trying to eliminate the normal mediators typically found in democratic states. 
In democratic states political parties are viewed as mediators in that they represent a bridge 
between the state and civil society (Ibid: 244). In Egypt, political parties are present, but they 
are restricted and marginalized in various ways, while they at the same time are incorporated 
into the state machinery (Albrecht, 2005: 391). The consequence is that Egyptian political 
parties have little value as mediators, which again makes them unattractive to the masses. 
People's critiques of the government cannot be channelled through the parties and they are in 
that sense of little help to the oppressed people (Fahmy, 2002: 255). 
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4.3 Institutions
The Egyptian parties are political organizations. They are also institutions, both in themselves 
and as part of larger entities. Institutions can be explained as “multifaceted, durable social 
structures, made up of symbolic elements, social  activities and material  resources” (Scott, 
2001: 49). As already indicated, institutions are present at all levels of society, from the large 
world structures to local structures between people (Ibid: 48).
Institutions are shaped by processes activated by three elements, the regulative (rules), the 
normative  (norms)  and  the  cultural-cognitive  (cultural  beliefs).  These  elements  form the 
institutional structures of our societies. They bring stability and order, and one can say that 
they are “the elastic fibres that resist change” (Scott, 2001: 49). This is done by restricting 
individuals and groups through defining legal, moral and cultural boundaries. However, at the 
same time as institutions resist change they also empower. This is because the legal, moral 
and cultural boundaries do not just represent prohibitions and constraints, but also guidelines 
and resources (Ibid: 50). When people and groups are empowered by the institutions they are 
part  of  they can  influence  and  affect  them,  and  the  institutions  can  themselves  therefore 
undergo change. The changes can be minor and take place within the existing structures of an 
institution. But the changes can also be of a major art, and challenge and change its very 
structure. The idea of institutions undergoing change is relatively new and it has altered our 
view of institutions as mere properties to also include a continuous state of process. Hence, 
institutions are dynamic entities (Ibid). 
Above, it was stated that the regulative, the normative and the cultural-cognitive elements of 
social  life  form the  institutional  structures  of  our  world.  One  can  say that  these  are  the 
symbolic aspects  of social  life (Scott,  2001: 49). But can symbolic elements develop and 
survive on its own? The answer to this is no, because there is a need for more hand fast and 
visible elements too. This is where behaviour or social action, and material resources come 
into the picture. When it comes to behaviour, Scott has written, “[r]ules, norms, and meanings 
arise in interaction, and they are preserved and modified by human behavior” (Ibid). If we 
take a look at material resources we find that they are important in relation to power. This is 
something Giddens and Sewell have written about and it comes down to the fact that if rules 
and norms are to be effective they need to be supported by power, and power is again related 
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to  resources  (Ibid:  49-50).  Both  of  these  points  illustrate  the  complexities  of  social 
institutions. 
Institutions across the globe develop differently and they also face different challenges. It is, 
for  instance,  a  fact  that  institutions  in  the  West  have  given  social  actors  (people  and 
organizations) greater autonomy and independence compared to South Asian societies (Scott, 
2001: 73). Maye Kassem suggests that both the Egyptian state institutions and the political 
opposition parties are weak (2004: 81-2). The state leader is placed above all institutions to 
the point that personal authoritarian rule has become institutionalised in contemporary Egypt. 
Such a system relies on a weak political system that is never fully institutionalised (Ibid: 167). 
Institutions in Egypt are therefore not as strong and decisive as in democratic countries. 
The idea of actors being able to influence and change institutions has been, and still is, a 
contested issue. Some scholars emphasize the constraints individuals face as actors within 
institutional structures. Other scholars give more attention to actors as being able to “make a 
difference” (Scott, 2001: 74). Anthony Giddens belongs to the latter group of scholars, but he 
is also seen as integrating both views. This has been done through his theory of structuration 
and that is where I am now turning. 
4.4 Structuration Theory by Anthony Giddens
Towards  the  end  of  the  1970s  Giddens  began  to  publish  literature  on  the  theory  of 
structuration. In his book Central Problems in Social Theory (1979) he writes that the theory 
begins from a lack of a proper theory of action in the social sciences. Understanding human 
action from the point of view of social  determinism was,  in his  eyes,  not right (Ibid:  2). 
Giddens  also  states  that  structuration  theory  should  be  viewed  as  “a  non-functionalist 
manifesto” (Ibid: 7). And he adds that “social systems have no purpose, reasons or needs 
whatsoever;  only human individuals do so” (Ibid).   In the following I shortly present the 
theory of structuration and elaborate on the points I find important in relation to my thesis. 
4.4.1 The Basic Features of the Theory
Structuration  theory  has  a  focus  on  social  structures.  Giddens  sees  these  structures  as 
consisting of patterns of social activities related in time and space. The social structures are 
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highly connected to rules and resources. Here, rules refer to “generalized procedures applied 
in  the enactment/reproduction of  social  life”  (Scott  1979:  75,  and Giddens in  Scott),  and 
resources to human or nonhuman objects “that can be used to enhance or maintain power” 
(Scott,  1979:  75,  and  Sewell  in  Scott).  Another  important  aspect  related  to  the  social 
structures are, what Giddens terms the ‘duality of structure’. By this he means that social 
structures  should  be  viewed  as  having  two  equally  important  aspects,  which  are  neither 
opposites nor mutually excluding. This phenomenon can be explained as structure being “both 
the medium and the outcome of the reproduction of practices” (Giddens, 1979: 5), or put in 
another way, that the social structures are both the “product and platform of social action” 
(Scott,  2001:  75).  The  duality  here  is  that  social  action  is  formed by the  existing  social 
structures while it at the same time can evolve beyond the structures and possibly transform 
them.
In the Egyptian case, the social structures are, among other things, shaped by authoritarianism 
and patron-client relations. Both concepts have been explained previously, but it can be added 
that  both  phenomenas  are  hierarchically  based.  This  has  implications  for  rules  and  the 
distributions of resources. Those high up in the hierarchical structures naturally control the 
resources and are privileged enough to make rules that favours themselves. This can partly 
explain why the current system in Egypt has proven resilient and difficult to change, because, 
when individuals and a system in general are supported by favourable rules and resources, this 
provides them with the power to control and suppress challenging forces. 
If the individual actors are placed within these grand structures it becomes apparent that also 
they  are  related  to  the  idea  of  duality.  Individuals  are  “simultaneously  constrained  and 
empowered by existing social structures” (Scott, 2001: 75). In order to understand this we 
must go back to the duality of structure. When social structures are both the product and the 
platform of social  action it  illustrates well  how these structures are both constraining and 
empowering actors.  Rules  and resources  are  an essential  part  of  this  duality of  structure. 
These two elements can both be constraining and empowering. Rules can prevent actors from 
doing what they want, but rules can also be favourable to certain actors. In addition, rules can 
provide a secure setting for acting. Resources can be used to gain power and in that way be 
empowering. It can also be used to prevent others from gaining power whom then will be 
constrained. We can conclude by saying that an individual’s actions are a product of the social 
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structures and thereby constrained in some sense. But these structures are also a foundation or 
a platform from where actors are empowered, and can influence and change structures if the 
actors manage to mobilize resources or are surrounded by favourable rules.
The concept of power needs some further elaboration. Within structuration theory power is 
related to interaction in a dual sense. Power is both present in the process of interaction and it 
is  used  to  accomplish  goals  (Giddens,  1979,  88).  In  the  process  of  interaction  power  is 
understood as a two way process where both parties, by mere involvement in the relationship, 
possess  power  over  the  other  (Giddens,  1979:  6).  This  illustrates  that  everyone  in  a 
relationship possess power simply because they are part of the relationship. The leader of a 
company is the most powerful person in an organization, but ordinary workers also possess 
power. This gives them a foundation from where to negotiate their position, fight for their 
causes  etc.  When it  comes  to  the  power to  accomplish goals  that  is  related to  rules  and 
resources. If the example of the company is used again, we find that the significant power of 
the  leadership  comes  from their  position  as  leaders,  and  the  resources  and rules  that  are 
present in the organization. Leaders can use both rules and resources to accomplish tasks they 
find important. However, in relatively democratic organizations rules are also present to limit 
the power of the leadership over the rest of the organization. 
But  does such an understanding of power work in  authoritarian states  and organizations? 
Here, the difference in power between the leadership and the others are severe. The leadership 
possess great powers through being supported by resources and favourable rules, and it may 
be  difficult  to  understand  where  the  power  of  those  outside  the  leadership  lie  and 
subsequently how they might challenge the leadership in interaction. This is an interesting 
issue and something I return to in the following chapter.    
Another key point in structuration theory is related to the individual actor. Giddens views 
actors as knowledgeable on the society they are part of (Giddens, 1979, 73). This means that 
actors  are  not  "cultural  dopes",  but  rather  possess  knowledge on their  situation and their 
society (Ibid: 71). Another term related to actor is agency. Agency refers to the ability actors 
have to affect the social world and in that way alter the rules and distribution of resources 
(Scott,  2001: 76). This is related to the idea that “the agent could have acted otherwise”, 
43
implying that actors can intervene in the world (Giddens, 1979: 56). However, Scott makes it 
clear that even though all actors (both individuals and collectives) possess agency, the amount 
of  agency varies  between  actors  and  forms  of  social  structures,  and  he  reminds  us  that 
“[a]gency itself is socially structured” (2001: 76). This illustrates well that every component 
of the social world is created within social structures and in that way is a product of it. But as 
Giddens emphasizes throughout his book, this does not keep actors from evolving beyond the 
current structures (1979).
4.4.2 Institutions and Social Change
Where does social change come into the larger picture of structuration theory? Giddens writes 
that  in  structuration  theory  “the  possibility  of  change  is  recognized  as  inherent  in  every 
circumstance of social reproduction” (1979: 210). This is related to all the concepts dealt with 
above. Here I just mention the duality of structure. According to the idea of duality, change 
can  be grasped when it  is  recognized that  action “both  draws upon and reconstitutes  the 
institutional organization of society” (Giddens, 1979: 255). Viewed in this way, change occurs 
continuously,  but the same goes for reproduction and continuation. The implication of the 
theory is that change for the most part is subtle, and only rarely revolutionary. 
How can we link the theory of structuration to institutions? Within the theory of structuration, 
institutions are viewed as “those types of social structures that involve more strongly held 
rules supported by more entrenched resources” (Scott, 2001: 75). This means that institutions 
consist  of  social  structures,  just  like  everything  else  in  the  social  world,  only that  these 
structures are stronger.  However, the duality of structure, rules and resources, agency and 
action, and all the other elements related to the structuration theory, are also present here. 
Therefore, continuity and change are the daily routine within institutional structures as well. 
4.5 The Internet
Burnett  and  Marshall  have  written  that,  “The  Internet  is  the  specific  name  of  the 
communication network that is comprised of millions of interconnected computers that freely 
exchange information with each other worldwide” (2003: 46). The use of the internet started 
to grow by the mid-1980s, and since then the growth has continued and become ever more 
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rapid (Ibid: 47). The Internet naturally affects our societies, including organizations of various 
kinds. In his book The Internet and Society James Slevin describes the changes organizations 
have  been  through  on  their  way  to  become  modern  organizations  (2000).  Centralized 
authority is not as rigidly preserved as before, but have opened out and in that way managed 
to form relationships across traditional bureaucratic hierarchies (Slevin, 2000: 126). Modern 
organizations also facilitate greater individual autonomy of action, which further makes space 
for innovation and the development of skills, in contradiction to plain fulfilment of duties 
(Ibid: 126-7). In this way, modern organizations are viewed as a constellation of relationships 
of intelligent agents (Ibid: 127). This understanding of actors as intelligent agents corresponds 
well  with Giddens’ view of actors as knowledgeable on their  situation and possessing the 
ability to affect the world around them.  
When Slevin writes about modern organizations he suggests how the internet can be used to 
further  develop these modern organizational  structures.  It  can help increase the spread of 
centralized  information,  increase  the  vertical  integration  of  the  organization  and  support 
networks  of  decentralization  (Slevin,  2000:  128).  The  internet  can  further  make  the 
significance of time and space less important (Ibid: 132), in the sense that people do not have 
to be at a particular place at a particular time in order to keep up to date and be included. All 
in all, the internet can contribute to more inclusive and transparent organizations that build on 
the knowledge of their members (Ibid: 129, 135). However, Slevin also makes it clear that the 
internet  is  not  a tool  that  can magically transform and change organizations.  First  of  all, 
organizations need to put much effort into organizing and monitoring the organizational links 
to the internet (Ibid: 137-8) (for example home page etc.). Second, one needs to be aware of 
the  fact  that  organizations  are  different,  with  different  histories,  geographies  and  general 
institutional arrangements, and therefore also need to be linked to the internet in different 
ways (Ibid: 136). Third, the use of internet in organizations may have positive as well as 
negative consequences. If an organization gets connected to the internet and people can do 
their job outside the office this can lead to an increased feeling of freedom and maybe also 
increased efficiency, but it can at the same time lead to a feeling of alienation. In addition, 
members/workers may also feel that the organization has omnipresence and can control them 
wherever they are (Ibid: 132).
45
Does  the  theory  of  modern  organizations  correspond  to  current  organizations  with 
authoritarian style leadership? In this sense, can the political parties in Egypt be viewed as 
modern  organizations?  When  related  to  Slevin's  arguments  I  must  say  no.  Centralized 
authority in  the various  parties  has  firmly been preserved and they do not  seem to have 
opened  out.  The  practice  of  authoritarianism  severely  limits  people's  freedom,  and  any 
significant  amount  of  individual  autonomy  can  thus  not  be  present.  If  the  authoritarian 
Egyptian parties are not modern organizations in the sense defined by Slevin, can their use of 
the  internet  affect  the  parties  and  possibly  transform  them?  The  internet  is  a  relatively 
democratic arena where actors are somewhat equal. On the open-accessed areas the internet 
does not distinguish between a party leader and a youth member. In this sense, the room for 
and the possibilities of individual agency, as described by Giddens, are highly present on the 
internet. It is then interesting to see how authoritarian organizations relate to and possibly are 
affected by a democratic technology such as the internet.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I have presented the theory that is used in the thesis, as well as elaborated on 
crucial concepts. I suggest that Giddens' theory on structuration, which holds a positive view 
of  human  beings  as  being  able  to  affect  the  social  world,  while  it  at  the  same  time 
acknowledges the power of existing social structures, can be used to discuss the role youth 
play  and  the  possibilities  they  have  in  the  Egyptian  opposition  parties.  However,  in  the 
Egyptian  case I  do not  believe  that  the  theory on structuration  can  explain  the  complete 
picture. Authoritarianism and other social phenomena related to it are important to include. 
Because, what happens when a leadership has the power to continuously suppress human 
beings, and when both the Egyptian state and the Egyptian society can be characterised as 
weak and as further affecting each other to stay weak? I find it interesting to combine these 
various theories, concepts and models as a frame for detecting the role youth play in a part of 
the Egyptian society.   
The concept of institutions is important for my understanding of the Egyptian political parties. 
The parties are political organizations and institutions, both in themselves and as part of lager 
political entities. However, Kassem has suggested that the Egyptian president is placed above 
all institutions, which has resulted in personal authoritarian rule becoming institutionalised 
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and the institutions themselves being weak (2004: 167). The leaders of the various political 
parties  can  be  thought  of  as  further  continuing  the  strong  position  of  the  ruling  figure 
compared with the institutions. This illustrates that viewing the Egyptian parties through the 
lens of institutional theory alone cannot work. Again, it is important to include some country 
specific phenomena like authoritarianism and patron-client relations.
What happens when the concepts of structuration theory, institutions, authoritarianism and the 
weak state-weak society model are applied in a study of the internet? The internet promotes 
agency and democratic relations. The parties, on the other hand, stand for authoritarianism 
and hierarchy. Structuration theory may suggest that Egyptian youth can use the internet as an 
arena from where to create agency and possibly social change. But is that possible within 
weak authoritarian organizations? In the next chapter, the analysis, I apply the theory and the 
various concepts presented here as I look into the issue of youth involvement and internet use 
in the Egyptian opposition parties. 
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5 YOUTH, INVOLVEMENT AND THE INTERNET
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I analyse and discuss the research questions and arguments that have been 
presented in preceding chapters. The discussion is based on first-hand information obtained 
through  interviews  with  party  members,  in  addition  to  secondary  literature.  The  data  is 
analysed  through a  backdrop  of  selected  theories  and concepts.  The  theories  I  apply are 
structuration theory, selected understandings of authoritarianism and institutions, in addition 
to  a  hypothesis  on  the  effects  the  internet  have  on  modern  organizations.  The  research 
questions are as follows:
 
1)  To  what  extent  may  youth  be  given  the  opportunity  to  involve  in  political  parties  in 
contemporary Egypt? The question is relevant due to the parties’ authoritarian structures. In 
particular, I look at access to formal positions in the different bodies in the party hierarchy 
and subsequently to participation in dialogues and decision-making. 
2) The use of internet is increasing in Egypt, in particular among the younger generation. 
What is the parties’ attitude to internet use, and to what extent has the internet become an 
arena for youth participation in authoritarian party structures? 
5.2 Youth and Involvement
As  previously  suggested,  authoritarianism  means  that  the  freedom  of  those  outside  the 
leadership is heavily restricted, and that the freedom of the authorities themselves faces few 
restrictions (Brooker, 2000: 22). This illustrates that restrictions, and therefore also exclusion, 
is the reality for the majority. Involvement on the other hand, can be explained as “the act of 
taking part in something” (Oxford Advanced Learner‘s Dictionary, 2005: 820). Restriction 
and exclusion seem to contradict with involvement. However, is it not possible to be partly 
excluded and involved? In this sense, is it possible to exercise involvement in an authoritarian 
party when you are outside the authority? Both the Egyptian state and the political opposition 
parties are authoritarian in structure. A small leadership holds a significant amount of power. 
The state leaders control a whole nation while party leaders exercise power within their party 
organization. Is it possible for youth to exercise some influence within such structures?
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If political parties are authoritarian in structure, they typically exercise exclusion. Youth can 
easily be viewed as too inexperienced and too radical to be given power. Being radical is a 
particularly dangerous trait for Egyptian political parties, since they function on the mercy of 
an authoritarian regime. If radical youth who want substantial change become too powerful 
within a party, the regime might feel threatened, and subsequently freeze the party, shut it 
down, or arrest party members. This could be an argument for excluding youth from power in 
political  parties.  At  the  same  time,  the  parties  are  dependent  on  active  youth  members 
(Wickham, 2002:  69).  Engaged youth members can be activists,  represent their  parties in 
different arenas and attract young people. In addition, they possess knowledge and skills that 
older generations often lack.  A senior member of the Democratic Front Party (DFP) said, 
“youth are a very essential part of the formation of the party”. Similarly, a top leader of the 
Wafd Party stated that “youth are very important for the party”, and he further estimated that 
60 percent of the member mass was thought to be youth. But are youth only active launching 
activities, or do they also participate in forming the parties on a higher level? The expression 
used  by a  senior  member  of  the  Social  Labor  Party  (SLP),  who  described  youth  as  the 
"muscles" of the party, might support the notion that youth merely participate in activities, but 
do not initiate or lead. However, according to the majority of my informants, both leaders and 
youth,  youth members  are  part  of  the higher  offices,  participate  in  discussions,  influence 
decision-making and the like. 
5.2.1 Formal Party Structures
Let us first look into the issue of youth representation. In order to do this I briefly explain the 
overall structure of one of the parties, namely the Tomorrow Party. I do not have a detailed 
outline of the structure of each of the parties included in this research, but I assume that the 
overall structure in somewhat similar since the parties have developed in the same political 
environment,  and many parties have developed by a fraction leaving a mother party.  The 
Tomorrow Party is  divided  into  three  levels.  1)  The  local  committees  are  headed by the 
Executive Board and the General Assembly. The local committees are among others the Youth 
Committee and the Committee for Woman. 2) The party has central committees headed by an 
Executive Board. This board is built up by the Secretary General, deputies, a treasurer, vice 
presidents,  assistants  and  finally  of  the  leaders  of  the  main  committees.  Among  the 
committees on the central level are the Organizational Committee, the Legal Committee and 
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the  Youth  Committee.  In  the  Tomorrow Party,  youth  members  (situated  in  the  local  and 
central youth committee) are not represented by quota neither in the local Executive Board 
and the General Assembly nor the central Executive Board. However, according to a central 
figure in the party, youth members can receive seats here if they are active and engaged in the 
party. In the summer of 2008 youth were, according to him, occupying seats here. 3) Above 
the central committees and the Executive Board is the General Assembly. This is the highest 
committee in the party. This assembly elects a Higher Council of 46-90 members, and also the 
president, and a Council of Wise Men. The Higher Council has five seats reserved for youth 
members. The council appoints the various members sitting in the central Executive Board. 
The Council of Wise Men consists of senior members that are above 60 years old that are 
appointed for life. Their main task is to oversee the party affairs and resolve conflicts when 
they evolve (all information communicated by party member).
Although  the  structure  of  the  parties  may  be  quite  similar,  youth  representation  differs 
between  the  various  parties.  In  the  Tomorrow Party we  have  seen  that  youth  only  have 
reserved seats in the Higher Council. The National Progressive Unionist Party (NPUP) on the 
other hand, has reserved one seat for the leader of the Youth Union (similar to the youth 
committees in the Tomorrow Party) in the higher offices at the local level, and 10 seats on the 
national level (information communicated by party member). In the not licensed Dignity Party 
there is an internal law stating that each part of the party (committees, board etc.) must leave 
one third of its seats for youth (information communicated by party member). The Dignity 
Party is,  in my view, a radical party on the Egyptian political  scene. It  argues for radical 
changes in the country, and urges for wide civil disobedience as a means to reach that end. In 
addition,  it  has  a  favourable  law  of  representation  for  youth.  In  this  sense,  the  party’s 
exclusion from legal political participation is not surprising. 
5.2.2 The Nature of Leadership
The descriptions above illustrate that youth have a voice in the upper levels of the parties. 
However, if the party leadership is authoritarian in its style of ruling, does upper-level youth 
representation really matter? In my opinion, the answer to this question depends on the style 
of ruling of the leadership, beyond that of being authoritarian. If the leadership is pragmatic 
and  listen  to  the  concerns  of  their  members  before  taking  a  final  decision,  youth 
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representation still matters and therefore has a great value. If however, the leadership is more 
dogmatic in style, youth representation may have little value on a party level concerning, for 
example,  outcomes  of  policies  and  decision-making.  In  this  sense,  the  level  of  youth 
involvement in political parties may vary from one party to another. Moreover, it is not the 
formal structures of representation and laws that matter here, but rather the subjective feeling 
and  experience  of  being  included.  The  members  of  the  Wafd  Party  that  I  talked  with 
emphasized the positive changes that had taken place after the party got a new chairman, 
Mahmoud Abaza. He was described as renewing the party, being interested in the internet and 
subsequently developing its use within the party.  Moreover, he was described as having a 
good relationship with the party's youth members and having a flexible attitude towards them. 
A central youth member in the party explained that for a long time the elders were the only 
ones in the leadership positions, but according to him, this had changed over the last two 
years  and  youth  now  play  a  more  important  role.  These  examples  illustrate  well  how 
important the chairman is for determining the course of the parties, and the integration and 
inclusion of youth members. In the following I look into how youth members themselves 
view their own participation in dialogues and decision-making.
5.2.3 Participation: Decision-making and Dialogue
A central youth member in NPUP, whom I call Mustapha, was satisfied with youth’s role in 
the party. By having one representative in the upper level in the local branch, Mustapha said 
that the youth union could influence decision-making. He also drew a picture of an active 
dialogue between the youth union and the rest of the party. These dialogues could also turn 
into more fierce discussions when a difference of opinion occurred, as Mustapha described, 
“we [sometimes] have to fight each other”. Most of my youth informants had similar opinions 
on youth involvement as that of Mustapha; they were satisfied with their level of participation 
in dialogues and decision-making. 
Two youth  members  from the  Wafd  Party,  whom I  call  Ali  and  Hassan,  were  also  quite 
positive regarding youth’s role within their party. Ali stated firmly that the youth members of 
his party have a great influence on the decision-making process. According to Ali, when there 
is a difference of opinion between youth and leaders, the topic opens up for discussion and the 
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camp holding the most convincing argument wins. Hassan was also quite positive to the role 
of youth within his party, but his opinions were more nuanced. He stated:
Formally youth are not involved in decision-making, but informally I can affect policies. I myself can affect 
policies taken by the party through lobbying (...) in the Supreme Committee. [They have a] democratic debate 
about the policies they pass. But you should convince them (...) you should do an effort to do so.
Hassan further presented some interesting statements regarding patron-client structures within 
the party. He said that youth members are given selected topics to engage with, which often 
turn out to be topics of less importance. He further explained that actors within the various 
parties are used as tools. In this sense, members are only receiving the exact information they 
need in order to do a job, and not the complete information. Members will therefore always 
come back to those above them in the political hierarchy and subsequently be dependent on 
them for the completion of political tasks. What Hassan is referring to here is a patron-client 
relationship. In chapter two this system was described as a trait of the state and the regime. 
The similarities between the state and the political parties were also made clear. Here then, we 
find another similarity. Patron-client systems are common in the Middle East, and since the 
state is, so to speak, built up on such a system, it is not surprising that the parties are engaged 
in it as well. In a patron-client system youth can easily end up at the bottom of the pyramid 
because they often have less experience, influence, power and resources.
Two youth members from the Democratic Front Party (DFP) were quite negative towards 
their leaders and youth’s possibilities of influencing the party. They said that youth members 
were viewed as important for the survival of the party, simply because youth make a party 
more powerful on the ground. But they made it clear that youth did not participate in decision-
making. Hussein admitted that the leader of the youth committee met with the party leaders, 
but as he explained:
They get someone from us, someone we do not like (…). And now if you ask them, they say that we have your 
representative, talk with your representative (…).  He can participate with them in the small office, but we do not 
know him, we do not know how to [cooperate] with him in decision-making and we do not agree with his 
mentality and so on. 
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Here we see that some youth members find youth representation to be of little value, while as 
we have already seen, others find it to be sufficient. This can be due to differences between 
the parties, after all the DFP is a newly established party and one can assume that the youth 
committee is not as organized as the youth committees in the older parties of NPUP, Wafd and 
SLP. However, the difference of opinion between various youth members can also be because 
some expect more from their party than others. The DFP is, as previously stated, a new party. 
The party is also emphasizing its democratic character (UNDP, informants). Young people 
that  decide  to  join  the  party  may  have  high  hopes  for  a  democratic  organization  and 
subsequently of youth getting a fair share of power and influence. In this sense, the youth 
members from the DFP may have been disappointed.  However,  I  talked with three youth 
members  from the  DFP.  I  interviewed  Omar  and  Hussein  first,  and  a  few  days  later  I 
interviewed Mahmoud. What is interesting here is that Mahmoud, in stark difference to the 
other two, was satisfied with youth’s role in the party and their ability to influence decision-
making. It then becomes apparent that the youth in the DFP are not so different from youth in 
other parties. This illustrates how individual the experiences of inclusion and participation 
are, and how they may differ between people within the same party. The DFP was the only 
party where I interviewed as many as three youth members. In the other parties I have only 
heard one or two views. This indicates that there are deferring views on the topic in focus 
within the parties as well. This further illustrates that being in contact with one or two youth 
members from the same party is not sufficient in order to understand the complete picture. 
However, it gives us an indication of the trends that are present within the parties.
5.2.4 Youth Challenging Authorities
Hussein from the DFP told me about a recent local election his party had participated in. He 
said that the youth members had been working hard with the election campaign, and since it 
was the party’s first participation in an election they had agreed on it only being a test. But a 
few hours before the end of the election day Hussein stated that the leaders decided to pull the 
party out of the race. According to him, the youth were furious and made a demonstration, and 
he further explained that:
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I confronted the president of the party (…) [and said that] it is not your decision to make, it is our decision. 
Never quite again and participate with us in decision-making (…). I have been removed from my appointed 
titles, I have only kept my elected titles.
Hussein also pointed out that the party had changed the limit for being considered a youth 
from 35 to 30.  In his  view, this  was done to get  rid  of the real  activists  from the youth 
committee and in that way control it. Because as he said, many youth members are ready to 
fight for real change and confront the regime, but the party leaders do not want this. Hussein, 
along with a few other members, which he described as real activists, had just past 30 years of 
age. As he explained:
 
Our leaders now need to control the youth activists, so they cast the age to be under 30 and they bring a lovely 
boy to manage those under 30 boys (…). He doesn't have his own vision (…) he just goes after the directions of 
the upper level of the party. I was not like that. I take my decisions, I impose my vision (…), I am very much 
convincing in the Supreme Council so the members there believe in me.
Among my interviewees, Hussein represents a different voice. He represents a  break  in the 
line of relatively positive youth, and is therefore an important informant. As I see it, the case 
of  Hussein  may suggest  that  as  long  as  youth  keep  inside  the  boundaries  drawn by the 
leadership youth seem to be included, but if they cross the line they become marginalized. 
Hussein appears to represent something different than his leadership. He wanted to fight for 
real political change, while the leaders may not want to do so for various reasons. Hussein 
stated:
We get little real practice because of the lack of political will among some leaders to go an engage in real  
political action because they want to protect their personal interests. It is very bad because they are very old and 
they have their  personal  interests somehow engaged with the government,  they are government employees. 
Somehow a government employee is an opposition leader, a party leader. So we are frozen, no real activities, just 
demonstrations with a smile, just workshops and training. Just academic issues that are not related to our society. 
In Hussein's opinion, his leaders do not fight for real change because they want to protect 
their own positions. However, it is a fact that if the parties challenge the regime they will be 
shut down. Whatever reasons a leadership has for engaging in a party, either it being personal 
enhancement or a true political vision, loosing its party status is never a good option. Hence, 
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the  parties  are  forced  to  carry  forth  the  boundaries  the  authoritarian  regime  has  set  up, 
otherwise they will  not survive as  legal  political  entities.  This  illustrates  the difficulty of 
examining the authoritarian parties separately from the authoritarian state.
In this part of the chapter I have suggested that the boundaries drawn by the party leadership, 
and indirectly by the state, offer some room for manoeuvring. This space gives youth the 
ability to participate and to be involved. However, it has also been illustrated that this issue 
both depends on the nature of the leadership and the subjective opinions and expectations of 
youth themselves. I further suggest that even though there is room for youth involvement 
there seems to be a firm line that cannot be crossed. The line seems to appear when youth 
directly challenge and go against their authoritarian leaders. But as long as their views and 
demands are moderate, the ability to influence and participate seems to be present.
5.3 Youth and the Internet
After interviewing both leaders and youth members in the various parties, I learned that the 
parties have different relationships to the internet. Some parties seem to be highly engaged 
with it, while others do not find it particularly useful and therefore do not engage actively in 
it. Moreover, it seems that regardless of the level of internet use within the various parties, the 
youth  members  are  the  most  active  in  this  field.  In  some  parties,  youth  members  are 
responsible for party web pages, in others, youth members are generally politically active on 
the internet and directly/indirectly represent their parties. In this part of the chapter, I look into 
parties' internet use and the role youth members play here, but first I give a brief presentation 
of the development of the internet in Egypt.
5.3.1 Internet in Egypt
Egypt has been one of the forerunners in the use of internet technology in the Arab region. 
The internet was first introduced in the country in the early 1990s. Then, it was only available 
on university campuses. By the late 1990s the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) were allowed 
in private hands and the internet expansion could begin. It was no longer only a service for 
students and staff at  universities,  but could be set up in private homes and in businesses. 
However, for the average Egyptian the cost of both a computer and internet access was too 
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high, and only a small minority could take part in the technological expansion. In 2003 Egypt 
began providing free internet services to its people, and internet cafés are blooming in the big 
cities (Tandros, 176-77). This has resulted in the internet becoming available to a larger part 
of the population, but severe poverty and high illiteracy is still challenging this development. 
It  is  interesting  that  Egypt,  an  authoritarian  state,  has  had  such  an  encouraging  attitude 
towards its people’s internet use. The internet naturally breaks down the state’s monopoly on 
information, and can in that way constitute a threat to its power. This even more so since there 
is unfiltered access to the internet in Egypt. However, internet activity is heavily monitored by 
the  state  (Hofheinz,  2005:  79)  and  people  have  been  sentenced  to  prison  for  publishing 
writings on the net (The Washington Post, 2007). Expressions of dissent towards the regimes 
in the region are widespread on the internet, and the various governments have not managed 
to silence it.  There has, on the other hand, been an increase in the use of technology for 
coordination and communication purposes among opposition groups and civil society activists 
(Hofheinz, 2005: 80). 
In 2003 it was estimated that four percent of the population in the Arab countries were using 
the internet. With the increase that was taking place the following year, it was suggested that it 
would rise to 11 percent in 2006. Egypt and Saudi-Arabia have the most internet users in the 
region. In 2005 they counted for a third of all Arab internet users. Internet use in the region is 
most widespread among urban, middle and upper class groups. It is further increasing the 
most among young people aged 20-30 and woman (Hofheinz, 2005: 82). When it comes to 
young people and the internet Hofheinz has suggested "among the younger, educated elites 
(...)  it  is  increasingly  a  fact  of  life"  and  "it  is  today  rapidly  becoming  a  factor  in  the 
socialization of the younger generation" (Ibid: 83). 
It is popular among Arab internet users to engage in debates, in fact "[n]o other language 
group debates as avidly on the Internet as Arabic speakers" (Hofheinz, 2005: 92). The most 
popular issues to debate are politics, religion and relations between the sexes. These topics are 
considered taboos in the region (Ibid).  However, on the internet people seem comfortable 
talking about them. When it comes to politics, Arab internet users are interested in political 
development and urges for political reform and public participation (Ibid: 89). Considering 
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people's  engagement in politics  on the internet  it  is  surprising to  hear that  the opposition 
parties in the region are weakly represented here. This seems to be due to the fact that the 
internet is not widespread enough within the population. In that sense, other communication 
and information tools are considered more appropriate for both the parties themselves and 
their followers. Party newspapers, telephone, sms (short message service), fax machines and 
face-to-face contact are the tools most widely used (Ibid: 84-85). However, concerning Egypt, 
my data suggests that the picture is more nuanced than that presented by Hofheinz on the 
whole Arab region, and that internet use among opposition parties seems to be on the rise. I 
elaborate on this below.
5.3.2 Youth and Internet Use within the Party Framework
All of the seven parties I have been in touch with were connected to the internet, either by 
party website and/or party newspaper website. This seems to have been a relatively resent 
development for some, while for other parties becoming "connected" is an older phenomena. 
The Wafd Party established a website two years ago, a development that was linked to the 
change of leadership in 2006. The party has however had an online newspaper for a longer 
time. In addition to the official sites, Facebook was mentioned by most of my informants, 
including party leaders, as a relatively useful tool for their party. Facebook is a social utility 
network where individuals can make their own profile, chat, post writings, post pictures and 
also create groups and event invitations in which people can join. Many of the parties I was in 
contact with are represented with a group on Facebook. This could be a specific group for 
their party or a group that supports their ideology. Popular leaders sometimes also have their 
own groups. In addition, a few parties have their own chat forums, and within the parties it is 
also popular for members to have their own Blog (all information communicated by party 
members). A Blog is a personal web diary where the owner can publish writings and receive 
comments  by  readers.  According  to  many youth  members,  Facebook  has  taken  over  for 
various other internet sites, such as Blogs, chats and the like. This because Facebook is a 
multi-functional network where various types of activities can be carried out on the very same 
web page.
Most  leaders  viewed the  internet  as  important  for  their  organization.  The  parties  use  the 
internet to spread information, find information and also to discuss various topics. Some of 
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the parties have an interactive website in which the reader can leave comments, in this way 
the flow of information is not only one-way, but rather two way. Discussions, on the other 
hand, seem to take place on the website Facebook. In the various parties it appeared to be 
mainly youth who were active on this site, with a few exceptions. One of the leaders of the 
Tomorrow Party, who had passed 50 years of age, described himself as the only "old" party 
member active on Facebook. I later found out that he also has a Blog. In general, leaders 
talked about Facebook in relation to their party in a positive manner. In some of the parties 
both leaders and youth expressed a satisfaction with all members' sufficiency with computer 
use in general and the use of internet in particular. While in other parties it was emphasized 
that youth contributes the most to the parties' work on the internet. In several parties it was 
stated that 'youth do all/most of the work on the internet'. One of the leaders of the NPUP told 
me that the old leaders do not know very much about computers and internet and are therefore 
dependent on the youth members in this area. Of the seven parties, three expressed that they 
are not dependent on youth to do their formal work on the internet. In the other four parties it 
was  said  that  youth  do  all  or  most  of  the  internet  related  tasks.  The  Nasserite  Party, 
represented in this study by one of the leaders and a regular youth member, is the party which 
expressed the least  enthusiasm about the internet.  The internet is used to find and spread 
information,  but  most  of  the  work  is  done  on  an  individual  basis,  not  on  the  more 
organizational level. However, also here it was made clear that the youth members are doing 
the existing internet work.
When six out of seven leaders express the view that internet is important for their party that is 
significant. In my opinion, when related to the information Hofheinz presented in his 2005 
article,  this  can  suggest  that  internet  use  among political  parties  in  Egypt  is  on the  rise. 
Hofheinz stated that internet use among Arab political parties was weak on average (p. 85). 
Considering Egypt’s early and widespread internet use, compared to other countries in the 
region, one could assume that the Egyptian political parties were more active here than parties 
in other countries. The activity must, however, have been low compared to other parts of the 
world. According to my informants during interviews conducted in 2008, three years after 
Hofheinz  published  his  article,  it  may seem as  though  the  internet  has  received  a  more 
prominent place within the Egyptian opposition parties. Here it is important to emphasize that 
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this is my view after conducting interviews with a few members belonging to seven different 
parties.
Hofheinz also explained that sms has been a significantly more popular tool than internet for 
mobilizing people to political protests in the region. In March 2003 there were mass protests 
all  over the Middle East  against  the invasion of Iraq.  In Egypt,  this  was the first  protest 
arranged by non-organized political groupings since the famous bread riot in 1977, and sms 
were said to be instrumental in organizing the protests (Hofheinz, 2005: 85). The 6th of April 
2008 was also a day of protests and strikes in Egypt.  The planning of the strike initially 
started among factory workers in the industrial city of Mahalla al-Kobra. Facebook activists 
later engaged in it by creating a group called 6th of April. The group ended up with around 70 
000  members  and  seem  to  have  been  much  of  the  reason  why  the  protest  became  as 
significant as it did (Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World, 2008, informants). 
Almost all of my informants mentioned the 6th of April Strike with proud and announced that 
also they had joined in. This incident illustrates that internet mobilization, along with sms, is a 
mobilization force in Egypt, and can suggest that using internet for political purposes is on the 
rise in the country.
In many of the Egyptian parties the 6th of April Strike seems to have been an eye opener 
regarding the importance of the internet.  Even though little was achieved in  the strike,  it 
managed to mobilize support. As one youth informant from the Dignity Party said:
After the April 6th Strike the internet is becoming a priority of importance for most political parties (…) after the 
strike they saw that there are some people that they can’t do anything about, that have a vision, a paradigm shift, 
and they now believe that those people can do something.
According to my informants, the regime had attempted to close the 6th of April group on 
Facebook, and after the strike many of the leaders of the group were jailed shortly. This again, 
illustrates the growing importance of the internet, as one of the leaders of the Dignity Party 
stated:
After the 6th of April Strike we gained a new power in Egypt, the independent Facebook youth. We discovered 
them, because most of them are not members in any party, they are just independent youth and they are used to 
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using the internet as a tool to exchange some social things. On 6th of April they emerged as a new power, a new 
political power.
The April 6th Strike and its related Facebook group seem to have excited and surprised many 
people, also my informants. The timing of my visit to the country two months after the strike, 
could possibly have affected my data in the direction of a more positive view of the internet. 
In this sense, if I had visited Egypt before the strike in April I would maybe have received 
more modest opinions on the various parties’ use of and view on the internet. 
5.3.3 Youth and Internet Use in "The Facebook Community"
In all of the parties I was in contact with, youth were described as the party members most 
active on the internet. They were politically engaged on different sites such as Facebook and 
Blogs. A small majority of the party leaders also confirmed that they were dependent on youth 
to  do  all,  or  most  of,  the  internet  related  party  work.  This  information  suggests  that  the 
internet  is  first  and  foremost  an  arena  for  party  youth. In  the  following,  I  turn  from a 
discussion on the parties' official websites, to discuss the more individual social forums. I 
mainly look into Facebook since it, according to my informants, is the most popular website 
to engage in these days. 
On Facebook youth have an independent profile. They are in that sense always representing 
themselves. However, they also represent their parties by creating party groups, groups for 
their  leaders,  event  invitations,  and  participate  in  discussions  with  the  viewpoint  of  their 
parties. This has, according to my informants, had some positive effects for the parties, such 
as attracting new members.  Youth engagement on Facebook, however, seems to contribute 
more to the build up of a politically engaged "Facebook community" than to party specific 
contributions. Mahmoud, a youth member from the DFP, explained that he had met many 
Egyptian  non-party  affiliated  political  activists  on  Facebook.  They  had  created  groups 
together and were also working on an internet based political magazine. Mahmoud further 
said that they were planning on arranging conferences so that they could meet face to face and 
not just on the internet. In this way, youth that are members of political parties and active on 
the internet seem to contribute more to the political development of the general society than to 
the parties they are members of. As one youth member of the Dignity Party explained: 
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Youth have an  advantage  because  they can  spread  their  ideas,  their  goals  and aims to  people who are  not 
members of the party (…). Because of this, youth have more influence outside the party because they can affect 
other people’s opinions and attract people to join the movement more than they can effect inside the party.
When older party members do not participate in these social forums they, and subsequently 
the parties, loose out on the contributions that come forth here. On the other hand, the forums 
loose out on valuable contributions older and more experienced party members may have. A 
leader in the Tomorrow Party, whom I call Waleed, told me that he was the only "old" party 
member  active  on Facebook.  Waleed  explained  that  he  had participated  in  creating  three 
political groups in this network. None of them were specifically related to his party, but rather 
created for the purpose of stimulating political debate. Waleed expressed a satisfaction with 
the debates that had evolved, and said he had found the topics to be thought provoking. The 
example of Waleed illustrates how useful engagement on social forums can be for both party 
leaders and other people engaging on the sites. It further illustrates that Facebook, initially 
thought of as a place where youth socialize and have fun, also can be a valuable place for 
political debates and subsequently for political development. 
Youth engagement on the internet seems to have strengthened the relations between youth 
members  within the various  parties.  The internet  makes it  easier  for  members  to  keep in 
touch, inform each other and discuss various issues and the like. In this way, internet activism 
seems to strengthen the relations within the various youth committees. Ali, a youth member in 
the Wafd Party, said that the internet had affected the various youth committees to a great 
extent, but it had not resulted in more communication with the leadership. He further said that 
the leaders are elders and that it  is easier  to communicate with youth.  This brings me to 
another issue. In some of the parties, like the NPUP, the age gap can be an explanation for the 
fact that mainly youth members are active on the internet. It was quite clearly stated from both 
the youth member and the leader that I was in touch with. The youth member said:
Most of the leaders in my party are old people so they don't understand how important the internet is. (...) you 
know, we have problems in the leftist trend in Egypt, we have no [middle aged members, just] youth from my 
age 29, 26, 24 and my leaders [that are] 60 and 70, understand me?
And the leader said (with the translation from another party member):
61
The old men that lead the party are not so good with computers so they depend on youth here. Because of that, 
the youth group does most of the internet work.
In some of the other parties however, the age gap does not seem to be as severe as in the 
NPUP. A youth member in the DFP said that the leader of his party was "too old" but that 
others  in  the leadership were around 40 and 50 years old.  He also stated that  almost  all 
members used the internet, but that youth were the most active. This can suggest that the age 
of the leadership makes a difference when it comes to mastering computer related tasks.
Both the leader and the youth members from the Tomorrow Party that I was in contact with 
told me that their party was built up of relatively young people. The leader, Ayman Nour, was 
said to be less than 40 when he established the party. Here, almost everyone was said to be 
able to use the internet, though youth were the most active. These different cases suggest that 
age matters when it comes to how widely the internet is used within a party. However, no 
matter the age of the leadership youth members seem to be the true internet activists.
In this part of the chapter, I have presented issues concerning the Egyptian political parties 
and their internet use. I have suggested that there is a gap in the use of internet between youth 
members and other members. Youth seem to be the most politically active on the internet. 
Facebook  is  a  particularly  popular  forum  in  which  to  create  political  dialogues  and 
discussions, and to simply stay informed. Youth internet activism seems to have benefited the 
larger internet community and the various youth committees, but since mainly youth members 
are active on the internet it does not seem to have affected the parties as a whole. I now turn to 
the  process  of  viewing  my  data  in  light  of  the  theoretical  framework  presented  in  the 
preceding chapter.
5.4 Can Authoritarianism and Youth Agency be Balanced?
So far, this chapter has illustrated that youth are involved in the Egyptian opposition parties. A 
majority of my youth informants said that youth both participate in dialogues and decision-
making, and are active on the internet doing party specific work on the party website and on 
Facebook. This may suggest that despite the authoritarian structures within the parties, youth 
members exercise 'agency'. In chapter four agency was described as the ability actors have to 
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affect the social world, and in that way alter the rules and distribution of resources (Scott, 
2001: 76). Youth members affect the parties they belong to by being represented in the higher 
offices  and  engaging  in  dialogues  and  decision-making,  in  addition  when  offering  their 
computer  skills  to  the parties.  However,  if  youth members  manage to  alter  the rules and 
distribution of resources is more uncertain. 
5.4.1 Youth and Agency
Earlier, Mustapha, a youth member from the NPUP, was introduced. In Mustapha's opinion, 
youth  can  influence  decision-making  and  participate  in  dialogues  and  discussions.  The 
majority of the youth members I spoke with shared Mustapha's view. When he described the 
relationship between the leaders and the youth members he said: 
(…) ][sometimes] we have to fight each other. Maybe we have an opinion, but it’s not in the political program 
(…), something like that we want to make a demonstration, but my party says that it is not a suitable time, so 
maybe we have to fight each other.
Here it is clear that youth members have some negotiating power since discussions, or fights 
as the informant described it, do take place. A youth in the Wafd Party said something similar 
about the process of decision-making within his party:
(…) sometimes there is a difference in the point of views, but this happens during meetings only. Youth try to 
convince the leaders with their point of view, or the leaders try to convince the youth with their point of view. 
This is convenient. When a [decision is made] both are committed by the decision. If I succeed in convincing the 
leader, or the leader by his, we are committed by this.
Both of these examples illustrate that youth have some negotiating power. If they argue well 
for their opinions their views can win forth in the parties. Their presence and engagement do 
subsequently affect  the parties,  in  that  way youth possess  agency.  This  can  be related to 
Giddens' understanding of power. Giddens sees power as present in the process of interaction 
and as used to accomplish goals. Related to power in interaction, it suggests that all parties 
hold power over the other, in that sense power is always two-way (Giddens, 1979: 6). The 
examples  above may then  indicate  that  both leaders  and youth  members  in  the Egyptian 
parties  possess  power  over  the  other.  The  leaders  are  supported  by favourable  rules  and 
63
various types of resources etc.,  but this does not mean that party youth are powerless. By 
being  members  of  the  various  parties,  youth  possess  power.  Members  are  needed  and 
membership from active youth is important. As I see it, actors must hold some sort of power 
in order to create agency. These concepts can therefore be viewed as interrelated.
Related to the internet, youth members are, among other things, active doing work on the 
party web page and on Facebook. On Facebook, youth have created party groups and event 
invitations and the like, and in that way placed their parties in the "Facebook Community". 
Their computer skills have further assisted some parties in creating and/or upholding a party 
web  page.  This  again,  illustrates  that  youth  members  in  the  Egyptian  opposition  parties 
possess agency, they affect their parties. Giddens has also emphasized the word 'actor'. By this 
he suggests that actors (individuals or collectives) are not "cultural dopies", but that they are 
knowledgeable on their society and their own situation (Giddens, 1979: 71). Considering the 
authoritarian nature of the state, many of the youth members I interviewed said that they were 
active on the internet because this was the best and the safest way to be politically active in 
Egypt. A youth member from the Tomorrow Party said (translated by another party member): 
The internet is now the main driving force behind the whole society in terms of political activation. And it is the 
easiest way to communicate and also the safest way, because if you go in a demonstration you're maybe liable to 
being arrested or harassed by the police or the security forces.  So the internet is relatively safer than other 
channels.
A youth member from the SLP stated (translated by external interpreter):
The youth members use the internet the most. (...). The party got frozen as well as the newspaper, therefore, the 
use of the internet got more common after the government froze the party. We started to market and advertise for 
our party through the internet.    
Both of these examples illustrate that youth engaged in the Egyptian opposition parties have 
an understanding of the society they live in. They have chosen to use the internet in relation to 
politics because it has many advantages compared to other political actions. However, some 
youth members are also aware of the negative effects of the internet, as Hussein from the DFP 
stated:
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[The internet  has]  helped very much our positioning in  a  segment  of  the  community,  however,  it  hurt  our 
positioning in another segment (...). We are seen as white collared people with technological things knowing 
nothing about the ground. Our plan was trying to bridge this gap talking about real cases online. 
Moreover, these examples illustrate that the youth members are actors and possess agency. 
But  are  these  actors  with  their  agency managing  to  affect  the  authoritarian  parties  on  a 
substantial level. This is what I look into in the following.
5.4.2 Youth and Social Change
So far, Egyptian youth participating in the opposition parties have been characterized as actors 
possessing  agency.  However,  in  structuration  theory  it  is  understood  that  the  amount  of 
agency differs between people and societies (Scott, 2001: 76). Authoritarian organizations that 
are part  of an authoritarian state may be viewed as challenging individual agency. In this 
sense,  people may possess agency,  but it  is held back and not able to alter  the rules and 
distribution of resources, and hence create social change.
Egyptian political life is dominated by an organization of patron-client relations. As illustrated 
in chapter two, the political parties are incorporated into the patron-client system developed 
by the authoritarian state and holds the president as the ultimate patron. Such a system of 
patrons and clients is related to the patriarchal system that is dominant in the region (Barakat, 
1993:  175).  In  a  patriarchal  system the  father  is  the  main  authority  and  has  the  overall 
responsibility for the family. The family unit has a prominent place in Arab societies and can 
be  described  as  a  "relatively  cohesive  institution  at  the  centre  of  social  and  economic 
activities"  (Ibid:  23).  Its  strong  positioning  in  society  has  resulted  in  a  diffusion  of  the 
patriarchal system to other social institutions. Thus, at work, in school, and in associations of 
both religious and political type one finds patriarchal systems with a father figure that "rules 
over others, monopolizing authority, expecting strict obedience, and showing little tolerance 
of dissent" (Ibid). Authoritarianism, as described in chapter four, can be understood as highly 
related to the patriarchal ideology. Hence, authoritarianism is present in the political system, 
as  well  as  in  interpersonal  and  social  relationships.  These  different  social  phenomena  of 
patron-client relations, a patriarchal system and authoritarianism seem to be interrelated and 
mutually reinforcing. 
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These three social phenomena, here referred to as patriarchal traits, are an important part of 
Egyptian institutions, and they must be viewed as contributing in shaping the rules, norms and 
cultural  beliefs  that  are  present  in  Egyptian  society.  They must  further  be  understood as 
affecting the behaviour of people and organizations, as well as the distribution of resources. 
As described in chapter two, the authoritarian state has developed unfavourable rules termed 
exclusionary laws. The opposition parties can also be viewed as having exclusionary laws 
since the leadership is described as acting dictatorial and the system as being undemocratic 
(Fahmy, 2002: 95-6). Nicola Pratt, the author of the book Democracy and Authoritarianism in 
the  Arab  World  suggests  how  authoritarianism  does  not  merely  have  an  economic  and 
institutional  dimension,  but  an  equally  important  cultural  dimension  (2007).  The  cultural 
dimension of authoritarianism means that the people (the dominated) believe in the ideology 
of authoritarianism itself. An example of this is when workers belonging to an authoritarian 
system  have  continued  to  support  the  ideology  of  the  reciprocal  relationship  of 
authoritarianism when the economic benefits have been withdrawn (Ibid: 10). As described in 
chapter two, the patron-client system provides people linked to the leadership with economic 
benefits, while it at the same time ensures continued support for the current system, this is 
then a reciprocal relationship. Pratt seems to view the cultural beliefs as an element outside 
the institutions themselves. However, as seen in chapter four, Richard Scott understands the 
cultural as part of the institutions, just as rules and norms. That is also how I have chosen to 
understand institutions. The cultural aspect, in addition to the rules and norms, illustrate how 
deeply existing institutions are entrenched in society, and subsequently how difficult they are 
to change.
Scott has described the rules, norms and cultural beliefs as the symbolic aspects of social life. 
As described in chapter four, these cannot alone uphold the institutional structures, but need 
both social behaviour and material resources (2001: 49). As seen above and in chapter two, 
Egyptian party leaders must be understood as behaving exclusionary and using the material 
resources they have gained as leaders and as participants in the patron-client system of the 
regime to uphold the authoritarian structures. In addition, the cultural beliefs have resulted in 
an  acceptance  of  the  patriarchal  traits.  When  such an  institutional  system,  which  clearly 
supports the leadership and the current organizational structures, is dominant in the Egyptian 
opposition parties one might be sceptical towards youth agency and social change. 
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As illustrated above, youth members possess agency to the point that they affect their parties 
by their  presence  and by their  initiatives,  as  for  example  through their  internet  activism. 
However, I do not see that youth members manage to affect the parties to the point where they 
alter the rules and the distribution of resources. As I see it, this is because the institutional 
structures of patriarchal traits are too strong. The patriarchal traits are used to control people 
and  social  entities.  Actors  are  therefore  limited  in  their  possibilities  of  affecting  the 
organization they are part of. Hence, the possibilities for social change in authoritarian parties 
may not be as probable as in non-authoritarian organizations. For example, when Hussein in 
the DFP was sanctioned because of his opinions on the election pullout, the party secured 
internal unity but missed an opportunity for critical debate. Such a debate could have resulted 
in crucial  organizational changes,  instead a youth member was partially excluded and the 
status quo was preserved. 
Mustapha from the NPUP told me that he and his fellow youth members for a long time had 
been arguing for their party to take on a more active internet approach. Their suggestions were 
met  with  rejections  by  the  leadership.  According  to  Mustapha,  the  leaders  could  not 
understand how the internet could be used for political work, in their eyes computers were 
only for pleasure. The leaders had only recently started to understand the importance of the 
internet, but Mustapha stated that he was not yet satisfied, as he said:
They started to understand us, but it is not enough. For example, they bring someone [to the party] and he doesn't 
understand anything about the internet, he just knows how to send e-mails, he doesn’t use the internet like an 
activist (...). Give us computers with internet access because now we use the internet from our homes. So for 
example, I stay at my party all day (...) but I have to wait until I come home to use the internet (...).  I don't want 
them [the leadership] to make planning for us, we can make it. But I want them to give us green light to do it. 
There are probably many reasons why leaders are sceptical towards the internet. As stated 
earlier, the leaders of the NPUP were characterized as old by a youth member and the party 
was further explained as having a generation gap.  Older people might not understand the 
importance of the internet because they are not familiar with it. Many of the parties are also 
known to have a tight budget. Investing in computers to the youth union may therefore not be 
prioritised. However, the fact that the leaders had previously been negative towards it, and 
allegedly changed their opinions after the April 6th Strike is interesting. It suggests that the 
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advocacy  of  the  party's  own  youth  members  were  not  taken  seriously,  but  rather,  a 
countrywide demonstration was needed for the leaders to understand. As Mustapha explained:
Now they are sure that they were wrong and we were right. Because now they [understand] that many people, 
many youth use the internet. I don't know if you know what happened in Egypt on April 6th through the internet, 
through Facebook? So the leaders started to ask us why we don't use the internet. And we said, we told you five 
years ago to support us, but you refused.
This  example  suggests  that  youth  members  are  actors  and  possess  agency,  but  that  their 
agency, at the same time, is not allowed to come forth within the parties, and subsequently 
affect and change the organizations. Earlier, the power present in interaction was elaborated 
on. It was then suggested that both party leaders and youth members possess power. However, 
Giddens  also views power as  used to  accomplish goals.  This can be related to  rules  and 
resources. The leaders of the various opposition parties are clearly more powerful than their 
fellow youth members. Subsequently, the leaders can mobilize resources and take advantage 
of favourable rules in order to accomplish goals. The goals might be related to ensuring a 
continuation of the status quo. The great inequality in power between youth and leadership 
may then seem to devalue the importance of power as present in interaction. Related to the 
Egyptian parties and the larger picture of continuity and change one might question if such 
power has any value at all.
Maye Kassem and others have described the Egyptian institutions as well  as the political 
opposition parties as weak (2004: 81-2). How can such weak entities mange to hold back 
individual and collective agency? As I see it, a possible answer may be the weak state- weak 
society cycle presented by Fahmy. This is a negative cycle where parts of society influence 
each  other  to  stay weak.  Even though actors  possess  agency the  forces  of  the  cycle  are 
proving too difficult  to penetrate,  and "the system is  preserved in a state of equilibrium" 
(Fahmy, 2002, 257). Another solution may be that the parties are weak institutions, but that 
the  various  parts  that  make  up  the  institutional  structures  are  strong.  In  this  sense,  the 
patriarchal  structures,  the patron-client  relations  as  well  as  the  authoritarian  ideology and 
structure may be strong. These social  phenomena have a long history in the Middle East 
region and are deeply rooted in society.
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In the previous chapter, James Slevin was introduced. He has suggested how the internet can 
affect modern organizations. Among other things, internet integration may result in greater 
vertical  integration  of  an  organization  (Slevin,  2000:  128).  Concerning  the  Egyptian 
opposition parties, an authoritarian political structure may suggest hierarchical distance within 
an organization, but if the internet is used actively by all segments of an organization it might 
result in increased vertical integration. On the internet, hierarchies are set aside and users act 
on an equal ground.  In my opinion, vertical integration may, among other things, lead to a 
higher level of youth involvement. This is because people can more easily be in touch with 
one another, and a diffusion of information can take place. In addition, the internet is a place 
for dialogues and discussions. Regarding the Egyptian parties, if such a development takes 
place that could result in youth occupying a larger space from where to exercise involvement. 
This because the internet offers youth a larger room in which to act, to present their concerns, 
and to be heard. 
As seen above in 5.3, mainly youth are active on the internet. In a few parties it was stated 
that other members also are able to master the technology and the parties are therefore not 
dependent  on  youth  in  order  to  be  visible  on  the  internet.  In  others,  it  was  expressed  a 
dependency on youth in this arena. Facebook is a place for dialogues and discussions, and in 
general for a more informal relationship between people. The fact that youth members are 
almost  exclusively  represented  here  rids  the  parties  of  a  unique  possibility  for  greater 
communication and subsequently a closer relationship between members. 
As  suggested  in  5.3,  youth  internet  activism seems  to  have  benefited  the  larger  internet 
community and the various youth committees, but does not seem to have lead to any party 
specific advantages in the direction of better vertical integration, and subsequently to higher 
youth involvement.  This is  my evaluation based on information received from informants 
stating that youth members are significantly more politically active on the internet than other 
members, and that other member often lack knowledge on computer and internet use. The 
internet engagement found among youth members seems to be valued within the parties as a 
tool to attract members, but it is still mainly a "youth activity" and can therefore not, as I see 
it, have resulted in better vertical integration of the parties. In my opinion, if the internet is to 
lead to higher vertical integration within an organization, all levels of the organization must 
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be engaged in it.  This does not seem to have taken place within the Egyptian opposition 
parties. However, because of the authoritarian nature of the parties, one might wonder if the 
parties will ever become better vertically integrated. 
A vertically integrated party structure is a contradiction to the existing social traits  in the 
parties.  I  am  here  thinking  of  the  patriarchal  structures,  patron-client  relations  and 
authoritarianism. For example, the patron-client relations are a vertically organized system of 
actors, which does not build on integration, equality and mutual respect. Rather, it is a system 
based on hierarchy,  distance and inequality,  in the sense that some actors should be more 
powerful than others. It is further the stronger part in the relationship that dictates and decides. 
This would suggest that increased vertical integration of the Egyptian political parties is not 
something authoritarian leaders would prefer. Hence, vertical integration, which could result 
in higher youth involvement, will most likely be challenged by party leaders and supposedly 
by the authoritarian regime. As I see it, youth representation in the formal party structures and 
their participation in dialogues and decision-making, in addition to youth engagement on the 
internet contributes to youth involvement and participation. However, in both cases the effects 
of their involvement are restrained. Concerning the formal party structures, this seems to be 
done deliberately by the leadership, while concerning the internet, it seems more of a natural 
outcome of the difference in interests and skills between youth and older members. 
Giddens'  structuration  theory  emphasizes  continuity  and  change.  Continuity  can  be 
understood as represented by the social structures present in society and change by the agency 
of actors. In Gidden's theory agency and social change seem to be closely related, in the sense 
that if agency is present, social change will naturally follow. However, as seen above, in the 
Egyptian case agency seems to be present among youth members, but social change is not the 
outcome, at least  not until now. The social structures of patriarchal traits,  the institutional 
arrangements as well as the weak state- weak society cycle seem to suppress the initiatives for 
change  within  the  political  parties.  Hence,  as  I  see  it,  the  theory  of  structuration  is  not 
completely suitable for understanding the forces of continuity and change within authoritarian 
parties in Egypt and supposedly in the Arab world.  But the theory contributes with some 
important tools for analyzing youth agency; it also gives an understanding of their importance 
in the parties and the possibilities that actually are present.
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Even though internet use does not seem to have lead to any party specific advantages that 
could affect young people's role within the parties, it does not mean that the youth themselves 
do  not  individually  take  advantage  of  their  own  internet  activism.  By  being  politically 
engaged on the internet, youth manage to get a hold of much information. Considering the 
nature of the state this is information that is difficult to receive without using the world-wide 
web. Since youth also have many dialogues and discussions on the internet it may suggest that 
by being active on the internet youth improve their dialogue and discussion skills. Eventually, 
this  may result  in youth becoming better  political actors, which can possibly give them a 
better place from where to negotiate their position within the parties.
This  study illustrates  the  gloomy state  of  negative  peace  that  exists  in  Egypt.  The  state 
represses its people, and political parties that are supposed to fight such acts finds its leaders 
following the same strategies; repressing its members. The fact that both the state and society 
are characterised as weak and caught in a cycle that reinforces their weakness further darkens 
the prospects for a development towards positive peace. In a weak state with a weak society 
“the establishment of life-affirming and life-enhancing values and structures” (Barash, 2000: 
2) seem distant. However, this study has also illustrated how youth involvement and youth 
agency is practiced to some extent through their involvement in the party hierarchy and their 
knowledge  of  and  engagement  with  new technology such as  computers  and  the  internet. 
These are positive signs in promoting positive peace.   
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter has focused on youth members in the Egyptian opposition parties. First, it has 
been made clear  that  youth are  represented in the upper levels  of the parties,  though the 
location and number of youth representatives differ between the various parties. Youth also 
seem able to participate in decision-making and dialogues. However, a few youth members 
were of the opinion that youth were excluded from decision-making. The story of one youth 
member suggests that youth are included as long as they keep inside the boundaries drawn up 
by the leadership (and indirectly by the authoritarian state), and marginalized if they cross the 
line. Second, internet use is rising in popularity among Arab youth. This is a trend that can 
also be found among youth in the Egyptian opposition parties. Youth members seem to be 
highly politically active on the internet, elder party members however, seem to be lagging 
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behind. This may suggest that internet engagement among youth members have contributed to 
the political development of the general society as well as strengthened the relations between 
the  youth  members  in  and  between  the  parties,  but  not  to  a  vertically  integrated  party 
structure. In order for the latter to take place, all segments of a party need to become active 
users. Third, in total this information indicates that youth members in the Egyptian opposition 
parties are actor and possess agency. However, the institutional/societal structures present in 
society and in the political parties, can be understood as holding a lid on the effects of youth's 
agency. Hence, substantial organizational change that could be initiated by youth is not taking 
place. This again, strengthens the weak state- weak society model and the understanding of 
Egypt as in a state of negative peace.
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6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
I have analysed the role young people hold in the political opposition parties in Egypt. The 
parties,  as  well  as  the  state,  are  authoritarian  in  structure.  I  have  focused  on  youth 
participation and involvement  through a few selected arenas:  1) Young people's  access to 
formal  positions  in  the  party  hierarchy,  and  subsequently  youths’ subjective  feeling  of 
participating  in  dialogues  and  decision-making.  2)  The  internet  as  an  arena  for  youth 
participation in party politics and as an arena for developing the party organization. These 
areas of inquires may shed light on the current situation of negative peace in Egypt and the 
prospects for change.
Previous research has illustrated that the opposition parties lack democratic structures and that 
the leadership acts dictatorial (Fahmy, 2002: 95-6, Stacher, 2004: 219, Albrecht, 2005: 383, 
Kassem,  2004:  77-9).  The  role  of  youth  has  been  described  as  merely contributing  with 
practical  skills  on the ground level  (Wickham, 2002:  69).  The research I  have completed 
illustrates that party leadership is characterized by dominance and authoritarianism, although 
many  youth  members  are  satisfied  with  their  level  of  involvement,  influence,  and 
representation in the party hierarchy. My research also suggests that internet use among the 
Egyptian opposition parties is on the rise, but the field is controlled by the youth members. 
This gives youth an additional arena of influence and a possibility to develop their political 
skills. However, it has so far not lead to organizational changes in the direction of vertical 
integration, changes that could result in a larger space for youth involvement. 
The results of the research indicate that there are arenas present for youth to act politically. 
However, I suggest that the authoritarian party structures block young people’s chances of 
influencing  the  parties  on  a  more  substantial  level.  Authoritarian  structures,  patron-client 
relations and patriarchal structures contribute to preserving the status quo. On a state level, 
this  condition  contributes  to  the  preservation  of  a  situation  of  negative  peace  and  to  a 
continuation of the weak state- weak society cycle. 
This study has been small in scope, and not comprehensive in order to completely understand 
the role young people hold in the Egyptian opposition parties. How youth members directly 
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affect party politics has not been explored in the thesis, nor has the issue of how youth engage 
in the political plays of fractions, alliance building and patron-client relations. Future research 
on these topics would result in a more comprehensive understanding of the role held by youth 
members, and subsequently to a better understanding of the possibilities and restraints faced 
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